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ABSTRACT 
 
The first essay, “Local Institutional Investors and the Maturity Structure of 
Corporate Debt”, examines the relation between the geographic proximity of a firm’s 
institutional shareholders and its debt maturity choices. Local institutional investors may 
pressure firms to employ short-term debt as a means of disciplining managers to reduce 
equity agency costs, and to reduce debt agency costs associated with debtholder-
stockholder conflicts caused by monitoring of local institutional investors. Thus, we 
hypothesize that firms with local institutional investors choose shorter debt maturity 
structures. Using dynamic GMM estimators to account for endogeneity and dynamic 
relations between debt maturity structure and institutional proximity, we find that firms 
with local institutional investors have shorter maturity debt. Similar results obtain for the 
maturity of new debt issues. To help establish causality, we use Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a 
quasi-natural experiment, conduct a nearest neighbor matching analysis that holds location 
constant, and employ a sample of firms’ headquarter relocations as quasi-exogenous 
shocks to the locality of institutional investors. The results demonstrate the importance of 
local institutional investors in affecting firms’ debt maturity policy choices. 
In the second essay, “The Effect of Algorithmic Trading on Firm Value”, we study 
the overall impact of algorithmic trading on firm value. Extant literature has found mixed 
evidence on the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality, and it is still under intense 
public debate and controversy that whether algorithmic trading is beneficial or not. Using 
an algorithmic trading proxy based on electronic message traffic, we find a positive 
 iii 
 
relation between algorithmic trading and firm value. The relation is stronger for firms with 
lower stock liquidity, higher idiosyncratic volatility, higher analyst coverage, and greater 
information asymmetry, which suggest that the value increases occur through market 
quality channels. The results are robust to various model specifications, reverse causality 
test using NYSE automated quote dissemination as an exogenous shock, and endogeneity 
concerns. The results imply net benefits of algorithmic trading to firms.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation consists of two essays in corporate finance, as presented in Sections 
2 and 3, which are parts of larger research projects of Johnson and Zhang (2014), and 
Johnson, Wang, and Zhang (2014), respectively.  
In the first essay, “Local Institutional Investors and the Maturity Structure of 
Corporate Debt”, we study the relation between the geographic proximity of a firm’s 
institutional shareholders and its debt maturity choices. This research is motivated by three 
lines of finance literature regarding agency conflicts and shareholder activism. It has been 
shown that institutional shareholders play important roles in mitigating agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders. Independent institutional investors with large 
ownerships have the incentive and ability to monitor managers of their investee firms. 
Moreover, due to their information advantage stemming from geographic proximity, local 
institutions are more effective in monitoring managers. In addition, literature shows that 
short maturity debt can reduce agency conflicts between shareholders and managers and 
conflicts between shareholders and debtholders.  
Combining the three lines of literature, we hypothesize that firms monitored by local 
institutional investors use shorter maturity debt to reduce agency problems. Local 
institutional investors may pressure firms to employ short-term debt as a means of 
disciplining managers and thereby reducing equity agency costs stemming from manager-
shareholder conflicts. Monitoring by local institutional investors likely increases the 
intensity of debtholder-shareholder conflicts. Shorter debt maturity should reduce these 
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conflicts and the associated debt agency costs. The two mechanisms both lead to the 
hypothesis that firms with local institutional investors use shorter maturity debt.  
The empirical results from analyzing existing debt maturity and maturity of new debt 
issues are consistent with the hypothesis. Dynamic system GMM estimation is used to 
account for endogeneity and dynamic relations between debt maturity structure and 
institutional proximity; with the new debt issue sample, a natural experiment, a nearest 
neighbor matching analysis, and a sample of firms’ headquarter relocations as quasi-
exogenous shocks to the locality of institutional investors are employed to establish 
causality. Furthermore, the effect of local institutional investors on maturity of new debt 
issues is stronger for firms with CEO-Chair duality, suggesting that firms monitored by 
local institutions use shorter maturity debt to reduce equity agency cost. Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Reg FD) is used as another natural experiment to rule out an alternative 
explanation that local institutions choose to invest in firms with shorter maturity debt. 
Overall results of the first essay demonstrate the importance of local institutional investors 
in affecting firms’ debt maturity policy choices. 
The second essay, “The Effect of Algorithmic Trading on Firm Value”, examines 
whether algorithmic trading has an overall beneficial impact on firm value. Algorithmic 
trading is a major recent innovation in the way financial assets trade, and has become more 
common and predominant in major financial markets, representing an estimated 78% of 
all U.S. equity trading volume in 2012. Given the significant role of algorithmic trading 
in the stock market, investors, academics, and policymakers need a deeper understanding 
of its benefits and costs. Extant literature examines impact of algorithmic trading on 
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financial market quality, but provides mixed results on the question of whether algorithmic 
trading is a beneficial financial innovation, leaving it the subject of intense public debate 
and controversy. So far very litter is known about how algorithmic trading affects firm 
value. 
We contribute the first evidence of the effect of algorithmic trading on firm value. 
By examining the effect of algorithmic trading on firm value, our study also provides 
evidence useful for evaluating the net overall cost or benefit of algorithmic trading. If 
algorithmic trading has net benefit to financial market, it should have a positive effect on 
firm value, and vice versa. Using an algorithmic trading proxy based on electronic 
message traffic, we find a positive relation between algorithmic trading and firm value; 
firms whose stocks are more heavily traded by algorithmic traders have greater value as 
measured by Tobin’s q. We use the NYSE automated quote dissemination as an exogenous 
shock to algorithmic trading to establish a causality from algorithmic trading to firm value. 
The positive effect is stronger for firms with lower stock liquidity, higher idiosyncratic 
volatility, higher analyst coverage, and greater information asymmetry, which suggest that 
algorithmic trading increases firm value by positively impacting financial market. The 
results imply net benefits of algorithmic trading to firms.    
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the first essay, 
“Local institutional investors and the maturity structure of corporate debt”. Section 3 
contains the second essay, “The effect of algorithmic trading on firm value”. Section 4 
summarizes the dissertation. 
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2. LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND THE MATURITY STRUCTURE  
OF CORPORATE DEBT  
 
We examine the relation between the geographic proximity of a firm’s institutional 
investors and the maturity structure of its debt. Monitoring by local institutional investors 
likely increases the intensity of debtholder-stockholder conflicts. Shorter debt maturity 
should reduce these conflicts and the associated debt agency costs. Local institutional 
investors may also pressure firms to employ short-term debt as a means of disciplining 
managers and thereby reducing equity agency costs stemming from manager-stockholder 
conflicts. Thus, we hypothesize that firms with local institutional investors choose shorter 
debt maturity structures. Using dynamic system GMM estimators to account for 
endogeneity and dynamic relations between debt maturity structure and institutional 
proximity, we find that firms with local institutional investors have shorter maturity debt. 
Similar results obtain for the maturity of new debt issues. To help establish causality, we 
use Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment, conduct a nearest neighbor 
matching analysis that holds location constant, and employ a sample of firms’ headquarter 
relocations as quasi-exogenous shocks to the locality of institutional investors. The results 
demonstrate the importance of local institutional investors in affecting firms’ debt 
maturity policy choices. 
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2.1 Introduction 
This research draws upon three lines of literature. The first line examines the role 
that institutional investors play in mitigating agency conflicts between shareholders and 
managers. Independent institutions with a long-term investment serve a monitoring role 
(Bushee (1998); Chen, Harford, and Li (2007)) and influence corporate behavior (e.g., 
Brickley, Lease, and Smith Jr. (1988); Hartzell and Starks (2003)). The second line 
examines the importance of the investors’ geographic proximity to firms. Institutional and 
individual investors exhibit a preference for local firms, appear to trade local securities at 
an informational advantage, and earn significant abnormal returns on local investments 
consistent with an information advantage stemming from proximity (Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999) (2001); Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010); Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005)). 
The information advantages of local institutional investors appear to increase their 
effectiveness in monitoring management-firms with local institutional investors are less 
likely to engage in empire building, to lead the quiet life, and to engage in corporate 
misbehavior such as earnings management and option backdating (Chhaochharia, Kumar, 
and Niessen-Ruenzi (2012)). The third line of literature focuses on how short debt maturity 
reduces the agency costs of managerial discretion (Rajan and Winton (1995); Stulz 
(2000)), reduces debt agency costs associated with asset substitution (Leland and Toft 
(1996)), and reduces managerial incentives to increase risk by exposing firms to liquidity 
risk (Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet (1980)).  
Drawing together the three lines of literature, we hypothesize that firms with local 
institutional investors choose shorter debt maturity structures. A risk-averse, self-
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interested manager with relatively undiversified holdings of equity and human capital in 
a firm may reject risky, positive-NPV projects and pursue relatively safe financial policies 
that do not maximize shareholder wealth. More effective monitoring of firms by local 
institutional (equity) investors should encourage managers to make the risky investment 
and financing decisions that maximize shareholder wealth, but such risk choices can 
exacerbate debtholder-stockholder conflicts. If stockholders would bear the resulting debt 
agency costs, they have an incentive to reduce them. One solution is for the firm to choose 
a shorter debt maturity structure. The greater monitoring and control by debtholders with 
shorter maturity should reduce debt agency costs and could be the value-maximizing 
choice for shareholders.  
The monitoring and discipline associated with shorter maturity debt also reduces 
equity agency costs if it reduces excess perquisite consumption by managers and/or 
improves managerial effort levels. For example, managers of firms with proportionately 
more debt maturing in the near term face greater liquidity risk, which may then translate 
into termination or other costs for the manager. A manager reduces the likelihood of 
bearing those costs by minimizing excess perk consumption and maximizing effort. If 
local institutional investors’ information advantages increase their awareness of the need 
to reduce such equity agency costs at some firms, they could pressure the firms to borrow 
short term to employ the debt as a disciplining device that complements their own efforts. 
This creates a second reason to predict a positive relation between short debt maturity and 
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local institutional investors.1 It is worth emphasizing that the motivation of local 
institutional investors to reduce debt agency costs and the motivation for them to reduce 
equity agency costs are not mutually exclusive.  
We examine the relation between firms’ existing debt maturity structures and 
measures of the geographic proximity of its institutional investors. We first calculate the 
geographic distance between each firm’s headquarters and its five independent 
institutional investors with the largest ownership fractions. Bushee (1998) and Chen et al. 
(2007) find that only independent institutions that have long-term investment horizons 
actively monitor firms, so we limit our analysis to independent institutions. Institutions 
with low ownership are unlikely to actively monitor management because information and 
monitoring costs may outweigh benefits from monitoring, so we focus on the five 
independent institutions with the largest ownership fractions in a firm. 
We define three proximity measures to capture the geographic proximity of a firm’s 
institutional investors: a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has one or more of its top 
five independent institutions located within 100 miles of the firm’s headquarters; the 
number of a firm’s top five independent institutions that are located within 100 miles; and 
a pure distance measure as the shortest distance between a firm’s top five independent 
institutions and the firm’s headquarters. Following Johnson (2003) and several other 
                                               
1 Our hypothesized positive effect of local institutional investors on short debt maturity is consistent with a 
complimentary relation between monitoring by institutional investors and monitoring effect of short term 
debt. Alternatively, these two monitoring effects may be purely substitutional. Although whether the relation 
is complimentary or substitutional is an empirical question, the complimentary relation is expected to occur 
in firms for which equity agency problems are relatively severe and intense monitoring is optimal, which is 
confirmed by our empirical results. 
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studies, we measure the debt maturity structure of each firm each year by the proportion 
of its total debt maturing within the next three years. We employ a dynamic panel model 
to take into account the dynamic relation between debt maturity structure and institutional 
ownership, and use two-step dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation to alleviate endogeneity concerns due to unobserved heterogeneity and 
simultaneity.2 
We find a significantly positive relation between the proportion of a firm’s debt that 
matures within three years and the presence of a local independent institutional investor. 
The effect is large economically: all else equal, the proportion of debt that matures within 
three years is 20.4 percentage points higher for a firm with a local independent institutional 
investor compared to one without, which represents approximately 60% of the mean short 
maturity proportion. The results are qualitatively similar for the measures based on the 
number of top five independent institutional investors that are local and on the distance 
between a firm’s headquarters and its geographically closest independent institutional 
investor. The results support the hypothesis that firms with local institutional investors use 
shorter maturity debt.  
The tests differentiate between the proximity of institutional investors and the 
presence of institutional investors. In specifications that omit the proximity measures, we 
                                               
2 The capital structure literature has recognized the dynamic nature of leverage, i.e., current leverage depends 
on past values of leverage, and has applied dynamic GMM model to study the determinants of capital 
structure and capital structure adjustments (Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008); Gaud, Jani, Hoesli, and 
Bender (2005); de Miguel and Pindado (2001); Drobetz and Wanzenride (2006); Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender (2008)). Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2006) apply the dynamic panel GMM estimator to examine 
the determinants of debt maturity structure. Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) apply the dynamic GMM 
estimator to account for the dynamic relation between firm performance and corporate governance. 
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find that the proportion of debt that matures within three years is positively related to the 
total ownership proportion of a firm’s top five independent institutional investors, and 
alternatively, the total ownership proportion of all of a firm’s independent institutional 
investors. When including the proximity measures in the regressions, coefficients on the 
institutional ownership measures are sometimes significant and sometimes insignificant. 
In contrast, when controlling for institutional ownership measures, the proximity measures 
are consistently statistically significant across regressions. We interpret these results to 
mean that independent institutional investors have a reliable effect on debt maturity only 
when they are local.  
The proportion of a firm’s debt that matures in the near term could reflect debt 
maturity decisions that were made years before the point at which we measure that 
proportion. For example, a large 20-year maturity debt issue made ten years ago could still 
be in the denominator of the proportion of total debt maturing within three years, and push 
that ratio down even if the firm more recently chose shorter debt maturities. To focus on 
incremental debt maturity decisions, we also examine the maturity of new debt issues by 
the sample firms. We compute the issue size-weighted average maturity, and alternately 
the equal-weighted average maturity, of new debt issues within the fiscal year for each 
firm, and regress the average maturity on lagged values of the institutional proximity 
measures and the control variables. Consistent with the results based on proportions of 
debt maturing in the near term, the results show that firms with local institutional investors 
choose shorter maturities for their new debt issues. 
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The new debt issuance sample enables us to use exogenous events to identify the 
causal effect of monitoring by local institutional investors on maturity of new debt issues. 
We first use the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) as a quasi-
natural experiment. SOX was enacted in July 2002 to increase the independence and 
oversight role of boards of directors. Prior studies have shown that overall corporate 
governance is improved and board monitoring is stronger in the post-SOX period. The 
enhanced monitoring by boards of director should reduce the need of monitoring by local 
institutional investors. If the effect of institutional proximity on debt maturity is 
attributable to effective monitoring by local institutional investors, we expect the effect to 
be weaker in the post-SOX period when monitoring by local institutional investors is less 
important. As expected, we find a diminished effect of institutional proximity on maturity 
of new debt issues in the post-SOX period, implying a causal effect of local institutional 
monitoring on debt maturity. Further analyses that use firms’ headquarter relocations as 
quasi-exogenous shocks to institutional proximity provide additional support of a causal 
effect. 
It is possible that purely area-specific effects drive the relation between debt maturity 
and local institutional investors. For example, institutional investors may locate in areas 
that also have large numbers of commercial banks. Given that bank loans tend to have 
relatively shorter maturity, if firms are more likely to borrow from local banks, the relation 
we find between short debt maturity and local institutional investors could be driven by 
the joint location of institutional investors and commercial banks, i.e., could be driven 
purely by an area-specific effect. We thus employ a nearest neighbor matching analysis to 
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compare firms headquartered in an area that have local institutional investors with firms 
headquartered in the same exact area and yet do not have local institutional investors 
(along with several other matching criteria). Our main results hold in this matched sample.  
As we note above, there is a potential debt agency cost motivation for local 
institutional investors to prefer shorter debt maturity and a potential equity cost 
motivation. Although the motives are not mutually exclusive, we conduct an additional 
test to shed light on the relative importance of the two. CEOs who are also chairman of 
the board of directors have more power than CEOs who are not chairman. The duality may 
weaken internal monitoring of CEOs, and exacerbate potential conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and managers (i.e., equity agency costs). Risk-averse CEOs with 
undiversified holdings of equity and human capital in a firm and with significant power 
might reject risky projects even though they are profitable, and/or might adopt safe 
financial policies (e.g., sub-optimally low leverage). Short-term lenders are unlikely to 
reduce these risk-related problems, and indeed may worsen them, because they benefit 
from low risk. In contrast, powerful CEOs might also consume excess perks and/or exert 
low effort, both of which harm stockholders and debtholders, and thus, create debt and 
equity agency costs. Monitoring and discipline by short-term lenders would be expected 
to reduce these perk and effort-related problems, and potentially generate spillover 
benefits for a firm’s stockholders. We find that the effect of institutional proximity on the 
maturity of new debt issues obtains only for firms with dual CEO-Chair, and thus the 
potential for more severe equity agency problems. The result suggests that the potential 
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reduction of equity agency costs (at least in part) drives the relation between debt maturity 
and local institutional investors. 
An alternative explanation of our finding is that local institutional investors do not 
influence firms’ debt maturity structure decisions, but rather that they simply choose to 
invest in local firms with shorter debt maturities. If local institutional investors’ 
information advantages make them more aware of manager-stockholder conflicts in firms, 
they might seek out local firms with shorter debt maturities because managers at these 
firms would be better disciplined by the short-term debt. The negative relation we find 
between maturity of new debt issuances and lagged top institution proximity (as well as 
lagged top institution ownership) does not support the self-selection explanation, unless 
local institutions have superior information about local firms such that they know in 
advance or can predict the maturity structure of future debt issuances of the firms.  
Nonetheless, to assess the plausibility of an information-based explanation for our 
findings, we conduct a test using the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg 
FD) in 2000 as a natural experiment. Gintschel and Markov (2004) find that Reg FD has 
been effective in reducing the informativeness of analyst information output, and Bernile, 
Kumar, and Sulaeman (2011) show that Reg FD eliminated the information advantage of 
local institutional investors, both of which would suggest weakening or disappearing of 
our finding after the implementation of Reg FD under an information-based explanation. 
We find that the impact of local monitoring institutions on maturity of new debt issues is 
not significantly weaker in the post Reg FD period. We infer similar conclusions when 
using inclusion in the S&P 500 as a proxy for the likelihood that local investors have an 
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information advantage (Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005)). Thus, it is unlikely that our 
results reflect solely an informational advantage of local institutions in choosing firms that 
benefit from short debt maturity.  
Our paper contributes to the growing literature examining the effect of local 
investors on corporate governance and policies. Gaspar and Massa (2007) find that local 
investors improve corporate governance. Becker et al. (2011) find that firms are more 
likely to pay dividends and pay higher dividends if higher proportion of local population 
is senior, suggesting that investor base affects corporate policy decisions. Ayers et al. 
(2011) show that local monitoring institutions reduce financial reporting discretion. 
Chhaochharia et al. (2012) show that local institutional investors are effective monitors: 
they are more likely to submit shareholder proposals, reduce excess CEO compensation, 
and increase CEO turnover. Our paper contributes to this literature by providing evidence 
that local monitoring institutions influence firms’ debt maturity, which is a key dimension 
of their financing choices. 
Our paper also contributes to the large literature on corporate debt maturity structure. 
Firms’ debt maturity choices have been linked to firm characteristics such as firm size, 
profitability, growth opportunities, leverage, firm level volatility, firm quality, asset 
maturity, etc. (e.g., Barclay and Smith (1995); Guedes and Opler (1996); Stohs and Mauer 
(1996); Johnson (2003)).  Recent literature has investigated the role of short-term debt as 
a tool to discipline or monitor self-interested managers and reduce the agency problem 
between managers and shareholders, and shown that debt maturity structure is related to 
the severity of the agency problem, such as managerial ownership, managerial 
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entrenchment, and board strength (e.g., Datta et al. (2005); Benmelech (2006); Harford, 
Li, and Zhao (2008)). Our paper shows that local institutional investors also affect debt 
maturity structure. To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper on a similar subject 
is Marchica (2011), who finds that short debt maturity is positively related to institutional 
ownership. Our paper differs from Marchica (2011) in that we focus on effect of 
geographic proximity, rather than ownership, of institutions; moreover, we find that in 
some specifications debt maturity is related to the proximity of institutional investors but 
not to their ownership proportions.  
 
2.2. Data and Methodology 
2.2.1. Sample  
We obtain institutional stockholdings data from the quarterly Thomson Reuters 
Institutional (13f) Holdings database. The sample period is from 1988 to 2008, limited by 
our access to data on institutional locations. Following Chen et al. (2007), we define 
independent institutions as those that are independent from corporate management as 
defined by Brickley et al. (1998) and have a long-term investment classified as dedicated 
or quasi-indexer institutions based on Bushee (2001). For each firm, at the end of each 
quarter we identify all independent institutions that hold common shares of that firm, and 
calculate their ownership fraction. Institutions with higher ownership should have stronger 
incentive to monitor managers compared to institutions with low ownership who may find 
the costs for them to obtain information and monitor may outweigh their benefits from 
monitoring; thus, we focus on the top five independent institutions in terms of the size of 
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shareholding, which we call monitoring institutions. For each of the monitoring 
institutions, we calculate the distance between the institution and the firm using the 
latitude and longitude coordinates of their headquarter locations. We obtain the zip codes 
of institutional locations from Nelson Directory of Investment Managers, and the zip codes 
of firms’ headquarters from Compustat and Compact Disclosure, and then obtain the 
corresponding latitude and longitude coordinates from the US Census Bureau’s Gazetteer 
Place and Zip Code Database.   
We obtain the debt maturity and other firm-level data from the Compustat database, 
and merge this dataset with the Institutional Holdings data by matching each fiscal year 
end in Compustat data with the most recent quarter in the Institutional Holdings data for 
each firm.  
2.2.2. Variables 
2.2.2.1. Measure of Geographic Proximity 
Our measures of institutional geographic proximity are based on the distance 
between institutions to firms. Following prior research (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (1999); 
Ayers et al. (2011); Chhaochharia et al. (2012)), we calculate the distance between 
institution i and firm j, distij, using the following formula: 
distij = (2πr/360)×arccos[sin(lati)sin(latj) + cos(lati)cos(latj)cos(loni - lonj)]           
where lat and lon are latitude and longitude in radians, respectively, and r is the radius of 
the Earth in miles (r = 3,963 miles). For each firm, we calculate the distance to the firm 
for the top five independent institutions. We then define a dummy variable, local, which 
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is set to one for firms with at least one of the top five independent institutions located 
within 100 miles. Our second measure of institutional proximity is local_inst, which is the 
number of top five independent institutions located within 100 miles. The last institutional 
proximity measure is min_dist, the shortest distance between the top five independent 
institutions and the investee firm. As a robustness check, we also measure the institutional 
proximity by the average distance from the top five independent institutions to the firm.       
2.2.2.2. Debt Maturity Measures and Control Variables 
Following Johnson (2003) and others, we measure the maturity structure of 
corporate debt by the proportion of total debt maturing in three years or less, st3. In a later 
section, we also study the maturity of new debt issues instead of the proportion of existing 
debt that matures in the short term.  
Following prior literature on the determinants of debt maturity structure (e.g., 
Johnson (2003); Brockman et al. (2010)), we include a set of other control variables in the 
analysis.3 Leverage, leverage, is the ratio of total debt to the book value of total assets. 
Firm size, lsize, is the market value of firm, computed as total assets minus book value of 
equity plus market value of equity, measured in logs, and lsize2 is the square of lsize. Asset 
maturity, asset_mat, is the book value-weighted average of the maturities of property plant 
and equipment and current assets.4 Market-to-book, mb, as a proxy for growth 
opportunities, is the ratio of market value of the firm’s assets to the book value of total 
                                               
3 See Johnson (2003) and Brockman et al. (2010) for motivations to include these variables. 
4 Asset maturity is computed as (gross property, plant, and equipment (Item #7)/total assets (Item #6)) ∗ 
(gross property, plant, and equipment (Item #7) /depreciation expense (Item #14)) + (current assets (Item 
#4)/total assets (Item #6)) ∗(current assets (Item #4)/cost of goods sold (Item #41)). 
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assets. Abnormal earnings, abnearn, is defined as the year-over-year change in the 
operating earnings per share divided by the previous year’s share price. Volatility, 
volatility, is defined as the standard deviation of first differences in EBITDA over the four 
years preceding the sample year, scaled by average assets over that period. Term spread, 
term, is the difference between the yield on ten-year government bonds and the yield on 
six-month government bonds at the fiscal year end.5 Several dummy variables are 
included. The regulated firm dummy, reg_dum, equals to one for firms with SIC code 
between 4,900 and 4,939 and zero otherwise. The rated firm dummy, rated, equals to one 
for firms with rated debt and zero otherwise. Z-score dummy, zscore_dum, equals one if 
Altman’s Z-score is greater than 1.81, and zero otherwise.6 To separate the effect of 
proximity of institutions from that of their ownerships, we control for the total ownership 
of the top five independent institutions, top5_io.  
2.2.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics of the main variables. The average firm in 
our sample has 34.3% of its total debt maturing in 3 years or less; 19.1% of its shares are 
owned by independent institutions, with top five of the independent institutions holding 
12.7% of shares. About one quarter of firms have at least one of the top five independent 
institutions located within 100 miles. The mean (median) of the shortest distance from the 
top five independent institutions to the firm is about 569 (356) miles.  
                                               
5 The interest rates of government bonds are obtained from FRED at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
6 Altman’s Z-score is computed as 3.3 ∗ Item #178/Item #6 + 1.2 ∗ (Item #4−Item #5)/Item #6 + Item #12 
/Item# 6 + 0.6 ∗ Item #199 ∗ Item #25 / (Item #9+Item #34) + 1.4 ∗ Item #36/Item #6. 
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Table 2.1. Summary Statistics for Section 2 
This table reports summary statistics of main variables of our sample. st3 is the proportion of total debt 
maturing in three years or less. io is total ownership of all independent institutions. top5_io is the total 
ownership of monitoring institutions. local is a dummy variable that is set to one for firms with at least one 
of the top five independent institutional investors being located within 100 miles, and zero otherwise. 
local_inst is the number of monitoring institutional investors that are located within 100 miles from the 
investee firm. min_dist is the shortest distance between monitoring institutional investors and the investee 
firm. leverage is leverage ratio, the ratio of total debt to the book value of total assets. lsize, is firm size 
measured as the market value of firm (in million dollars) in logs. asset_mat is Asset maturity, computed as 
the book value-weighted average of the maturities of property plant and equipment and current assets. mb, 
is market-to-book, the ratio of market value of firm to the book value of total assets. abnearn, is abnormal 
earnings defined as the year-over-year change in the operating earnings per share divided by the previous 
year’s share price. volatility, is defined as the standard deviation of first differences in EBITDA over the 
four years preceding the sample year, scaled by average assets over that period. Term spread, term, is the 
difference between the yield on 10-year government bonds and the yield on 6-month government bonds at 
the fiscal year end. reg_dum, is a dummy variable that equals to one for firms with SIC code between 4,900 
and 4,939 and zero otherwise. The rated firm dummy, rated, is a dummy variable that equals to one for firms 
with rated debt and zero otherwise. Z-score dummy, zscore_dum, is a dummy variable that equals one if 
Altman’s Z-score is greater than 1.81, and zero otherwise. 
Variable Mean Std Dev 5th Pctl 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 95th Pctl 
st3 0.343 0.334 0.000 0.054 0.230 0.565 1.000 
io 0.191 0.157 0.006 0.062 0.157 0.287 0.495 
top5_io 0.127 0.102 0.005 0.048 0.105 0.185 0.315 
local 0.254 0.435 0 0 0 1 1 
local_inst 0.330 0.636 0 0 0 1 2 
min_dist 569 609 7 95 356 845 2089 
leverage 0.269 0.204 0.007 0.103 0.245 0.388 0.651 
lsize 5.844 2.006 2.833 4.327 5.681 7.218 9.462 
asset_mat 9.755 10.153 0.939 3.087 6.302 12.435 31.582 
mb 1.904 1.576 0.816 1.091 1.398 2.059 4.678 
abnearn -0.011 0.276 -0.360 -0.034 0.006 0.029 0.250 
volatility 0.084 0.067 0.017 0.040 0.065 0.107 0.217 
term 1.472 1.271 -0.390 0.540 1.210 2.470 3.930 
reg_dum 0.040 0.196 0 0 0 0 0 
rated 0.281 0.449 0 0 0 1 1 
zscore_dum 0.820 0.384 0 1 1 1 1 
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2.2.4. Methodology 
In this section we discuss our model specification and the appropriateness of 
alternative estimation methods, including OLS, instrumental variables, difference-GMM, 
and the recently developed system-GMM estimation, and explain why we choose the 
system dynamic panel GMM method to analyzing existing debt maturity structure. 
2.2.4.1. Model  
We employ a panel data framework to examine the relation between existing debt 
maturity and the geographic proximity of institutional investors to control for unobserved 
firm heterogeneity. Specifically, we estimate the following dynamic panel model to 
examine the relation between st3 and the institutional proximity measures, 
st3it = β0 + β1 localit (alternately, local_instit or min_distit)+ β2 top5_ioit  
          + β3 st3i(t-1) + ∑βk xk,it + ui + vt + εit                                                                (2.1) 
where xk is the set of control variables defined above, including leverage, lsize, lsize2, 
asset_mat, mb, abnearn, volatility, term, reg_dum, rated, and zscore_dum, ui represents 
time-invariant unobservable firm-specific effects (e.g., reputation, and capital intensity), 
and vt represents time-specific effects (e.g., demand shocks, interest rates, etc.) that are 
common to all firms and can be time-varying. The lagged value of debt maturity, st3i(t-1), 
is included to account for the dynamic nature of the relation between debt maturity and 
institutional ownership as discussed below.7  
                                               
7 Wintoki et al. (2012) use a similar dynamic panel model to examine the relation between firm performance 
and corporate governance. 
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2.2.4.2. Methods of Estimation 
The appropriate method to estimate Equation (2.1) must control for the endogeneity 
due to unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. OLS estimates of Equation (2.1) would 
be biased because ui is unobservable and correlated with other independent variables 
(Hsiao (1985)), and may be inconsistent because lagged dependent variables can be 
correlated with the time-invariant firm specific effects (heterogeneity). Although first 
differencing would eliminate ui, the OLS estimates would still be inefficient because ∆εit 
and ∆st3i(t-1) are correlated through the correlation between εi(t-1) and st3i(t-1).8 The 
instrumental variables (IV) approach would not solve the problem either. ∆st3i(t-2) and 
st3i(t-2) can be used as instruments for ∆st3i(t-1), because ∆st3i(t-2) and st3i(t-2) are correlated 
with ∆st3i(t-1) but not with ∆εit. However, the IV estimates are unlikely to be efficient, 
because the IV approach does not use all the moment conditions and does not account for 
the different structure of the error term. 
Another source of endogeneity in Equation (2.1) is simultaneity. Existing literature 
shows that leverage and debt maturity are endogenously chosen and often estimates a 
system of equations where leverage and debt maturity are jointly determined (e.g., 
Barclay, Marx, and Smith (1997); Johnson (2003); Datta et al. (2005)). It is likely that 
other explanatory variables for debt maturity are also jointly determined with leverage and 
debt maturity, however, and shocks that affect leverage and debt maturity could also affect 
other explanatory variables such as firm size and abnormal earnings. Marchica (2011) uses 
                                               
8 In addition, OLS estimation assumes that all independent variables are strictly exogenous, which may not 
be true in debt maturity decisions. 
 21 
 
a system of equations where institutional investor ownership, leverage and debt maturity 
are jointly determined. Brockman et al. (2010) endogenize debt maturity, leverage, 
executive compensation related variables (delta and vega), R&D, and capital expenditure 
and estimate a system of six equations. Even though additional explanatory variables 
could be endogenized, but as more variables are endogenized, it is increasingly difficult if 
not impossible to find valid instruments.    
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using of a dynamic panel GMM estimator to 
overcome these problems.9 The dynamic panel GMM estimator can handle fixed effects, 
control for endogeneity, and eliminate dynamic panel bias. It accounts for unobservable 
heterogeneity by including firm fixed effects, and accommodate dynamic panel model by 
allowing current values of independent variables to be affected by past values of the 
dependent variable, an advantage over traditional fixed-effect estimators. Due to 
orthogonality conditions between past values of variables and the error term, lagged 
variables can be used as valid instruments to account for simultaneity, and utilizing such 
‘internal” instruments, dynamic panel GMM method provides consistent estimators 
(Arellano and Bond (1991)). Specifically, dynamic panel GMM estimation uses past 
values of endogenous variables as instruments, which eliminates the need for external 
instruments, an important advantage over the traditional instrumental variable estimates. 
Because of this aspect, dynamic panel GMM can accommodate multiple endogenous 
variables, and can treat all explanatory variables as endogenous, as we do in our 
                                               
9 Several sets of authors worked to develop the dynamic panel GMM estimator: Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and 
Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond(1998). 
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estimation. Therefore, the dynamic panel GMM estimator can accounts for endogeneity 
due to unobservable heterogeneity and simultaneity, as well as dynamic relations between 
dependent and independent variables. 
We adopt system dynamic panel GMM model. Although the difference-GMM, 
GMM specification estimated in first-differences using instruments in levels, is superior 
to other methods, recent studies show problems with the difference-GMM estimator. First-
differencing can result in information loss across firms, which can cause substantial loss 
of efficiency in dynamic GMM estimators (Arellano and Bover (1995)). Arellano and 
Bover (1995) propose the system-GMM specification, which is estimated in both levels 
and first difference using instruments in first differences for level equations and 
instruments in levels for first-difference equations. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that 
the efficiency of the system-GMM estimator is significantly higher than that of the 
difference-GMM estimator, especially for short sample period and persistent data.  
To account for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity of error terms, we employ 
two-step approach to estimate the system dynamic panel GMM model. Using residuals 
from first-step estimation to construct asymptotically optimal weighting matrices, the two-
step estimators are more efficient than one-step estimators if error terms are expected to 
be correlated over time or heteroskedastic across firms.  
To ensure that the dynamic system GMM estimators are consistent, we perform 
several tests of validity of the orthogonality assumptions and the strength of the 
instruments. The key exogeneity assumption is that the historical values of dependent and 
independent variables are exogenous with respect to the current innovations of the 
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dependent variable. For our GMM estimators, by construction, the first differencing 
transformation induces first-order serial correlation (AR(1)) in the differenced residuals, 
but no second-order correlation (AR(2)), a critical condition for the consistency of the 
GMM estimators. So the first test we conduct is a test of second-order serial correlation, 
AR(2) test, under the null hypothesis of no second-order correlation. The second test, 
Hansen test of over-identification, tests the validity of instrument. It yields a J-statistics 
that is distributed as chi-square under the null hypothesis of valid instruments. The third 
test is a Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity, which yields a J-statistics that is distributed as 
chi-square under the null hypothesis that instruments used for the equations in levels are 
exogenous. We examine all of these tests for our dynamic GMM estimators.  
One caveat for the dynamic system GMM estimation is that in cases of numerous 
endogenous variables and absence of an optimal way to choose the instrument set, we may 
have the “many instruments” problem and could overfit the endogenous variables. Bearing 
this possibility in mind, we use the “collapse” option in xtabond2 command when 
performing the dynamic system GMM estimation in Stata.10  
 
  
                                               
10 See Roodman (2009, 2009b) for more details on the use xtabond2 command and the “too many 
instruments” problem. 
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Table 2.2. Relation between Current Institutional and Firm Characteristics and Past Debt 
Maturity Structure 
This table reports the estimation results of ordinary least square (OLS) regressions of institutional 
ownerships (io and top5_io), institutional proximity measures (local, local_inst, and min_dist), firm leverage 
(leverage), and firm size (lsize) on past values of debt maturity structure (lag_st3) and other firm 
characteristics. The institutional distance measure, min_dist, is standardized (mean is set to zero and standard 
deviation is one).T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and within correlation 
clustered by firm. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 io top5_io local local_inst min_dist leverage lsize 
lag_st3 0.004 0.003 -0.012 -0.017 0.023 -0.010 -0.014 
 (3.34) (3.08) (-2.52) (-2.59) (1.84) (-5.93) (-1.85) 
lag_leverage -0.014 -0.002 -0.019 -0.024 0.118 0.843 -0.078 
 (-6.15) (-1.24) (-1.95) (-1.75) (4.72) (219.42) (-5.53) 
lag_lsize 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.007 -0.051 0.000 0.977 
 (29.63) (21.16) (3.69) (4.46) (-14.63) (0.75) (579.51) 
lag_mb 0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.024 
 (0.24) (-2.09) (2.92) (2.16) (-0.97) (-2.03) (-10.67) 
lag_roa 0.023 0.015 -0.023 -0.029 0.025 -0.023 0.115 
 (11.23) (9.90) (-2.36) (-2.20) (0.91) (-5.17) (5.63) 
lag_rated -0.003 -0.002 -0.009 -0.011 0.040 0.010 0.032 
 (-2.39) (-2.81) (-2.00) (-1.60) (3.64) (7.30) (5.57) 
lag_zscore_dum 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.005 -0.041 -0.013 -0.014 
 (7.94) (7.04) (1.03) (0.70) (-3.30) (-8.01) (-2.20) 
lag_sp500 -0.023 -0.016 0.005 0.001 0.072 -0.012 0.042 
 (-14.30) (-13.02) (0.67) (0.05) (4.56) (-8.09) (6.67) 
lag_io 0.823       
 (217.81)       
lag_top5_io  0.783      
  (153.21)      
lag_local   0.643     
   (123.49)     
lag_local_dist    0.682    
    (113.32)    
lag_min_dist     0.581   
     (83.21)   
Obs. 58,178 57,748 57,958 57,958 57,958 58,178 58,178 
adj. R2 0.741 0.642 0.415 0.466 0.390 0.727 0.955 
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2.3. Main Results 
2.3.1. Dynamic Relation between Debt Maturity and Institutional Ownership/Proximity 
In this section we assess the dynamic relation between debt maturity and institutional 
ownership and geographic proximity to validate the use of the dynamic panel model 
shown in Equation (2.1). To show that the institutional ownership and geographic 
proximity are related to past debt maturity, we regress measures of institutional ownership 
and proximity on the lagged debt maturity and other firm-specific variables that are related 
to institutional ownership, including lagged dependent variables. As shown in Table 2.2, 
coefficients on lagged st3 are significant in all regressions in which the dependent 
variables are the total ownership of all independent institutions (io), the total ownership 
of the monitoring institutions, or top five independent institutions, (top5_io), and the three 
measures of institutional geographic proximity (local, local_inst, and min_dist). Thus, 
institutional ownership and geographic proximity are significantly positively related to 
past debt maturity.11  
Besides institutional ownership and geographic proximity, Table 2.2 shows that 
leverage and lsize are significantly negatively related to the lagged st3. This indicates that 
it is not only institutional ownership and the geographic proximity measures that can be 
considered endogenous, but other control variables are likely to be endogenous as well. 
  
                                               
11 Similar results are obtained when changes in, instead of levels of, institutional ownerships and geographic 
proximity are regressed on the lagged debt maturity and other firm-specific variables. 
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Table 2.3. Pooled OLS Regressions: Static vs. Dynamic 
This table reports estimation results of pooled OLS regressions. The dependent variable is st3. In each panel, 
models (1) and (2) are the same except for that lagged st3 (lag_st3) is included as an additional explanatory 
variable in model (2). The institutional distance measure, min_dist, is standardized (mean is set to zero and 
standard deviation is one). T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and within 
correlation clustered by firm.  
  Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
  (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
lag_st3   0.551   0.551   0.552 
   (101.34)   (101.32)   (101.40) 
local  -0.013 -0.004       
  (-2.83) (-1.68)       
local_inst     -0.011 -0.004    
     (-3.54) (-2.31)    
min_dist        0.004 0.001 
        (2.08) (1.00) 
top5_io  0.088 0.041  0.090 0.042  0.089 0.041 
  (4.03) (3.18)  (4.11) (3.23)  (4.06) (3.18) 
leverage  -0.295 -0.155  -0.295 -0.155  -0.296 -0.155 
  (-21.69) (-18.12)  (-21.70) (-18.13)  (-21.72) (-18.12) 
lsize  -0.059 -0.030  -0.059 -0.030  -0.058 -0.030 
  (-8.65) (-8.08)  (-8.61) (-8.05)  (-8.42) (-7.92) 
lsize2  0.003 0.001  0.003 0.001  0.003 0.001 
  (5.38) (5.43)  (5.34) (5.40)  (5.20) (5.32) 
asset_mat  -0.001 -0.000  -0.001 -0.000  -0.001 -0.000 
  (-3.31) (-2.60)  (-3.33) (-2.62)  (-3.26) (-2.56) 
mb  0.007 0.003  0.007 0.003  0.007 0.003 
  (3.43) (2.39)  (3.45) (2.40)  (3.38) (2.37) 
term  0.008 0.004  0.007 0.004  0.008 0.004 
  (6.21) (4.48)  (6.17) (4.46)  (6.22) (4.48) 
abnearn  -0.026 -0.024  -0.026 -0.024  -0.026 -0.024 
  (-5.50) (-5.28)  (-5.49) (-5.28)  (-5.52) (-5.29) 
volatility  0.341 0.145  0.340 0.145  0.340 0.144 
  (8.42) (5.29)  (8.41) (5.29)  (8.39) (5.27) 
reg_dum  -0.053 -0.028  -0.054 -0.028  -0.053 -0.028 
  (-5.30) (-5.65)  (-5.32) (-5.66)  (-5.24) (-5.60) 
rated  -0.097 -0.047  -0.097 -0.047  -0.097 -0.047 
  (-16.78) (-14.27)  (-16.79) (-14.28)  (-16.76) (-14.26) 
zscore_dum  -0.049 -0.033  -0.050 -0.033  -0.049 -0.033 
  (-8.89) (-9.21)  (-8.90) (-9.22)  (-8.84) (-9.18) 
Obs.  50,604 50,604  50,604 50,604  50,604 50,604 
adj. R2  0.152 0.400  0.152 0.400  0.152 0.400 
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We further demonstrate the dynamic relation by comparing the estimation results of 
static and dynamic models, and showing how including past debt maturity in debt maturity 
regressions affects the estimation results. As shown in Table 2.3, we regress st3 on local 
(Panel A), local_inst (Panel B), and min_dist (Panel C). In each panel, model 1 is static 
while model 2 is dynamic with lagged st3 being included as the additional regressor. It is 
evident that by including lagged st3 as the additional explanatory variable, the magnitude 
and significance level of the coefficients on the ownership and geographic proximity 
measures are significantly reduced in the dynamic models, and R-squares of the dynamic 
models are significantly higher than those of the static models. For example, as shown in 
Panel B, the coefficients on local_inst and top5_io in the dynamic model are less than half 
of those in the static model, and their t-statistics are also much lower in the dynamic model, 
while R-square increases from 0.152 to 0.400 when moving from the static model to the 
dynamic model. The results clearly indicate the importance of past debt maturity in 
assessing the relation between debt maturity and institutional geographic proximity. Past 
debt maturity explains a significant proportion of the variation of current debt maturity. 
The reduction in magnitude of the coefficients on institutional ownership and geographic 
proximity when moving from the static model to the dynamic model again suggests that 
current institutional ownership and geographic proximity are correlated with past debt 
maturity.  
Although we show that including past debt maturity improves OLS estimation, it is 
very likely that unobservable heterogeneities are not fully captured by past debt maturity, 
and endogeneity due to simultaneity is not controlled for in OLS estimation. The dynamic 
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relation between debt maturity and institutional ownership and proximity demonstrated in 
this section validate the use of the dynamic panel model. By including both past debt 
maturity and fixed effects and endogenizing all independent variables, dynamic system 
GMM estimators account for the dynamic relation, unobservable heterogeneity, and 
simultaneity. Therefore, in next section, we use the dynamic system GMM model to 
estimate the relation between debt maturity and institutional geographic proximity.  
2.3.2. Dynamic Panel System GMM Estimation 
In this section we discuss the results from two-step dynamic panel system GMM 
estimation. All estimations control for firm, industry and year fixed effects. Table 2.4 
shows that the coefficients on all of three measures of institutional proximity are 
statistically significant. The positive coefficient on local implies that, compared to firms 
without local monitoring institutions, firms with at least one local monitoring institution 
have shorter debt maturity. The effect is large economically. Compared with firms without 
local monitoring institutions, firms with at least one local monitoring institution have an 
additional 20.4 percentage points of their debt maturing in the short term, which is 59.5% 
(0.204/0.343=59.5%) relative to the mean of st3. The significantly positive coefficient on 
local_inst implies that firms with more local monitoring institutions have shorter debt 
maturity. Again here, the effect is large economically: adding one more local monitoring 
institutional investor increases the proportion of short-term debt by 13.4%, or 
equivalently, by 39.1% (0.134/0.343=39.1%) relative to the mean of st3. The coefficient 
on min_dist is significantly negative, indicating that the proportion of debt that is short 
term decreases as the distance between firms and the monitoring institutions increases, or 
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Table 2.4. System GMM Estimates of Dynamic Panel Model: Institutional Proximity 
This table reports the results of dynamic panel two-step system GMM estimation of relation between debt 
maturity structure and geographic proximity top five independent institutional investors. The dependent 
variable is st3. Independent variables of interest are local, local_inst, and min_dist. min_dist is standardized 
(mean is set to zero and standard deviation is one). Firm, industry and year fixed effects are included, but 
their coefficients are not reported. The industry classifications are defined based on 2-digit SIC code. T-
statistics are in parentheses. p-values of AR(2) test, Hansen test, and Diff-in-Hansen test are reported. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
local 0.204   
 (2.83)   
local_inst  0.134  
  (2.62)  
min_dist   -0.084 
   (-2.86) 
top5_io 0.111 0.101 0.074 
 (0.67) (0.62) (0.43) 
leverage -0.019 -0.013 0.069 
 (-0.17) (-0.12) (0.59) 
lsize -0.137 -0.133 -0.154 
 (-3.55) (-3.46) (-3.79) 
lsize2 0.010 0.009 0.011 
 (3.41) (3.35) (3.71) 
asset_mat 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.22) (1.22) (1.00) 
mb -0.006 -0.005 -0.015 
 (-0.23) (-0.22) (-0.66) 
term 0.054 0.033 0.038 
 (2.19) (1.38) (1.53) 
abnearn -0.258 -0.260 -0.271 
 (-4.21) (-4.24) (-4.44) 
volatility -0.432 -0.321 -0.049 
 (-0.67) (-0.53) (-0.08) 
reg_dum -1.583 -1.418 -1.523 
 (-2.45) (-2.33) (-2.44) 
rated -0.088 -0.082 -0.093 
 (-2.29) (-2.15) (-2.37) 
zscore_dum -0.061 -0.053 -0.046 
 (-0.92) (-0.82) (-0.69) 
lag_st3 0.515 0.538 0.526 
 (5.70) (5.77) (5.61) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.992 0.913 0.924 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value) 0.398 0.360 0.546 
Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity (p-value) 0.179 0.147 0.396 
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equivalently, firms with monitoring institutional investors closer to their headquarters 
have higher proportions of short-term debt.  
We note here that the coefficients on top5_io are not statistically significant. 
Untabulated results indicate that when institutional proximity measures are excluded from 
the estimation, the coefficients on top5_io are statistically significant. Thus, in these 
regressions, it is the geographic proximity of institutional investors that matters, not the 
ownership levels of those investors.  
For all estimations reported in Table 2.4, p-values of the second-order serial 
correlation (AR(2)) test are all large such that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
second-order serial correlation. The Hansen test and the Diff-in-Hansen test also produce 
insignificant p-values and as such, we cannot reject the null hypotheses that our 
instruments are valid and the instruments for the level equations are exogenous.  
In summary, using dynamic panel system GMM estimators to account for 
unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity, and the dynamic nature between debt maturity 
and institutional ownerships, we find statistically and economically significant evidence 
that local independent institutional investors are associated with shorter debt maturity. The 
results support the hypothesis that firms choose shorter debt maturity if they have local 
institutional investors who monitor the firm.   
2.3.3. Maturity of New Debt Issues 
In this section we provide additional evidence to support the finding in the previous 
section by examining the impact of institutional geographic proximity on the maturity of 
new corporate debt issues. Whereas a measure of the proportion of total debt maturing in 
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the short-term could be affected substantially by debt maturity decisions made many years 
prior, this analysis of new debt issues has the advantage of focusing on incremental debt 
maturity decisions made at a particular point in time.  
2.3.3.1. Baseline Results 
We obtain debt issuance data from the Securities Data Company (SDC), and include 
all public bond issues, private (non-Rule 144A) issues, Rule-144A issues, and syndicated 
loans in the sample. To consolidate the issue-level observations into firm-year format, we 
treat multiple issues within a fiscal year as a single issue and compute an issue size-
weighted average maturity (sw_maturity, in log) and an equal-weight average maturity 
(ew_maturity, in log) for firms with multiple issues. After merging the new issue data with 
the institutional ownership and geographic proximity data, there are 9,503 firm-fiscal year 
observations.    
Following Brockman et al. (2010), we run pooled OLS regressions for our new issue 
sample. Considering that multiple debt issues can be issued anytime within a fiscal year, 
we lag independent variables by one year. Year and industry fixed effects are controlled. 
Table 2.5 presents the results. The dependent variables are sw_maturity and ew_maturity 
in Panel A and Panel B, respectively, and the results are similar for the two maturity 
measures. Although their coefficients are only marginally significant, both (lagged) local 
and local_inst are negatively related to the maturity of new debt issues, which suggests 
that firms with (more) local monitoring institutional investors issue shorter maturity debt. 
The significantly positive coefficients on (the lagged) min_dist suggest (inversely) that the 
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Table 2.5. Maturity of New Debt Issues  
This table reports results of OLS regressions of maturity of new debt issues on institutional geographic 
proximity. The dependent variables are the issue size-weighted average maturity (sw_maturity, in log) in 
Panel A and the equal-weighted average maturity (ew_maturity, in log) in Panel B, respectively. Independent 
variables of interest are lagged local, local_inst, and min_dist. min_dist is standardized (mean is set to zero 
and standard deviation is one). All control variables are also lagged one year (denoted by prefix l_). Industry 
and year fixed effects are included, but their coefficients are not reported. The industry classifications are 
defined based on 2-digit SIC code. T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and 
within correlation clustered by firm. 
 Panel A: sw_maturity  Panel B: ew_maturity 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
l_local -0.081    -0.088   
 (-1.61)    (-1.62)   
l_local_inst  -0.078    -0.079  
  (-1.77)    (-1.85)  
l_min_dist   0.045    0.045 
   (1.72)    (1.82) 
l_top5_io -0.655 -0.645 -0.652  -0.706 -0.700 -0.712 
 (-2.93) (-2.87) (-2.89)  (-2.96) (-3.11) (-3.17) 
l_leverage 0.612 0.607 0.562  0.552 0.612 0.605 
 (4.61) (4.57) (4.26)  (3.86) (4.52) (4.47) 
l_lsize 0.351 0.357 0.330  0.308 0.292 0.280 
 (3.07) (2.53) (2.86)  (2.50) (2.11) (2.42) 
l_lsize2 -0.022 -0.022 -0.021  -0.017 -0.016 -0.015 
 (-2.94) (-2.30) (-2.77)  (-2.11) (-1.72) (-2.09) 
l_asset_mat 0.007 0.010 0.007  0.008 0.010 0.009 
 (2.35) (2.96) (2.43)  (2.61) (3.18) (2.92) 
l_mb -0.012 -0.029 -0.013  -0.040 -0.040 -0.034 
 (-0.50) (-0.98) (-0.50)  (-1.48) (-1.30) (-1.46) 
l_term -0.050 0.070 -0.050  -0.005 0.060 -0.071 
 (-1.31) (0.77) (-1.32)  (-0.07) (0.66) (-1.83) 
l_abnearn 0.184 0.221 0.188  0.177 0.203 0.237 
 (2.52) (2.01) (2.49)  (2.12) (1.78) (2.93) 
l_volatility -0.123 -0.024 -0.148  -0.542 -0.297 -0.036 
 (-0.20) (-0.03) (-0.24)  (-0.82) (-0.37) (-0.06) 
l_reg_dum -0.406 -0.360 -0.382  -0.395 -0.361 -0.346 
 (-2.04) (-1.76) (-1.92)  (-2.08) (-1.71) (-1.73) 
l_rated 0.049 0.032 0.059  0.048 0.028 0.060 
 (0.72) (0.42) (0.83)  (0.71) (0.37) (0.86) 
l_zscore_dum -0.066 -0.087 -0.076  -0.015 -0.030 -0.024 
 (-0.96) (-1.02) (-1.11)  (-0.20) (-0.35) (-0.35) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7,387 7,387 7,387  7,388 7,388 7,388 
adj. R2 0.229 0.229 0.230  0.227 0.227 0.228 
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closer are the monitoring institutional investors located to the firm, the shorter is the 
maturity of the firm’s new debt issues. The results are consistent with the findings in the 
previous section for existing debt maturity structure and support the hypothesis that local 
institutional investors prefer shorter debt maturity.  
2.3.3.2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a Quasi-natural Experiment 
When analyzing existing debt maturity structure in the earlier section, we employ 
system dynamic GMM estimators to mitigate endogeneity concerns. In this section, the 
new debt issuance sample enables us to use an exogenous event to identify the causal 
effect of monitoring by local institutional investors on the maturity of new debt issues. We 
use the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) as a quasi-natural 
experiment. SOX was enacted in July 2002 as a reaction to a number of high-profile 
corporate scandals and aimed to increase the independence and oversight role of boards 
of directors. Prior studies have shown that overall corporate governance is improved and 
board monitoring is stronger in the post-SOX period (e.g., Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) 
(2009)). The improved monitoring by boards of director should reduce the need for 
monitoring by local institutional investors. If the finding of shorter debt maturity in firms 
with local institutional investors reflects more effective monitoring by local institutional 
investors, we expect to observe a diminished effect of institutional proximity on maturity 
of new debt issues in the post-SOX period.  
To test this conjecture, we define a dummy variable, post_sox, which is set to one 
for post-SOX period (after 2002) and zero otherwise, and include in the new debt issue 
regressions an additional term that interacts one of the institutional proximity measures 
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with the dummy variable post_sox. The regression results are shown in Table 2.6. The 
coefficients on the institutional proximity measures are highly significant and keep the 
same signs as those in Table 2.5, while the coefficients on interaction terms are significant 
and have signs opposite to those of the corresponding proximity measure.12 The results 
indicate that the effect of institutional proximity on maturity of new debt issues is much 
stronger before implementation of SOX, consistent with the notion that effective 
monitoring by local institutional investors lead to shorter debt maturity in firms with local 
institutional investors.  
The diminished effect of institutional proximity on debt maturity in the post-SOX 
period may explain the relatively marginal significance of the institutional proximity 
measures shown in Table 2.5. Comparing results in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6, we note that 
both the statistical and economic significance of the institutional proximity effect on debt 
maturity are greater in the pre-SOX subsample period (before 2003) than in the full sample 
period. For example, as suggested by the coefficients on local and local_inst in Panel A 
of Table 2.6, in the pre-SOX period, the maturity of new debt issued by firms with local 
institutional investors is 12% shorter than firms with no local institutional investors, and 
one more local institutional investor implies an 8% reduction in maturity of new debt 
issues.13  
                                               
12Results of F-tests indicate that the sum of the coefficients on each institutional proximity measure and its 
corresponding interaction term is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that the effect of 
institutional proximity on maturity of new debt issues diminishes in the post-SOX period. Subsample 
regressions also confirm the result. 
13 The maturity of new debt issues is log transformed. The coefficient on local of -0.129 indicates a reduction 
in log of maturity of 0.129, which is translated into a 12% decrease in maturity. Similarly, the coefficient on 
local_inst of -0.084 is translated into an 8% reduction in maturity. 
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Table 2.6. Maturity of New Debt Issues:  SOX in 2002 as a Natural Experiment  
This table reports results of OLS regressions that use Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 as a natural 
experiment to identify the causal effect of local institution monitoring on maturity of new debt issues. The 
dependent variables are the issue size-weighted average maturity (sw_maturity, in log) in Panel A and the 
equal-weighted average maturity (ew_maturity, in log) in Panel B, respectively. The institutional distance 
measure, min_dist, is standardized (mean is set to zero and standard deviation is one). post_sox is a dummy 
variable that equals to one for all years after 2002 and zero otherwise. All independent variables are lagged 
one year (denoted by prefix l_).  Industry and year fixed effects are included, but their coefficients are not 
reported. The industry classifications are defined based on 2-digit SIC code. T-statistics in parentheses are 
adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered by firm. 
 Panel A: sw_maturity  Panel B: ew_maturity 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
l_local -0.129    -0.119   
 (-2.15)    (-1.95)   
l_local×post_sox 0.156    0.143   
 (2.56)    (2.34)   
l_local_inst  -0.084    -0.086  
  (-1.93)    (-2.02)  
l_local_inst×post_sox  0.114    0.122  
  (2.57)    (2.80)  
l_min_dist   0.056    0.048 
   (2.27)    (1.93) 
l_min_dist×post_sox   -0.086    -0.081 
   (-2.99)    (-2.75) 
post_sox -0.353 -0.350 -0.527  -0.404 -0.406 -0.650 
 (-3.34) (-3.31) (-3.85)  (-3.74) (-3.76) (-4.72) 
l_top5_io -0.326 -0.324 -0.398  -0.383 -0.378 -0.452 
 (-2.01) (-1.99) (-2.41)  (-2.34) (-2.30) (-2.72) 
l_leverage 0.461 0.457 0.487  0.451 0.449 0.479 
 (4.85) (4.82) (4.86)  (4.56) (4.55) (4.54) 
l_lsize 0.247 0.246 0.264  0.172 0.171 0.192 
 (2.91) (2.90) (3.04)  (1.93) (1.93) (2.12) 
l_lsize2 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015  -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 
 (-2.73) (-2.72) (-2.87)  (-1.50) (-1.50) (-1.70) 
l_asset_mat 0.005 0.005 0.006  0.005 0.005 0.006 
 (2.12) (2.15) (2.37)  (2.25) (2.27) (2.50) 
l_mb -0.032 -0.032 -0.037  -0.037 -0.037 -0.043 
 (-1.70) (-1.70) (-2.00)  (-1.89) (-1.90) (-2.22) 
l_term -0.030 -0.029 -0.040  -0.046 -0.045 -0.055 
 (-1.06) (-1.02) (-1.41)  (-1.58) (-1.55) (-1.94) 
l_abnearn 0.099 0.100 0.134  0.106 0.108 0.140 
 (2.16) (2.18) (2.70)  (2.29) (2.33) (2.80) 
l_volatility -0.080 -0.070 0.125  -0.214 -0.200 0.023 
 (-0.16) (-0.14) (0.26)  (-0.43) (-0.40) (0.05) 
  
 36 
 
Table 2.6 Continued    
 Panel A: sw_maturity  Panel B: ew_maturity 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
l_reg_dum -0.180 -0.181 -0.169  -0.154 -0.155 -0.142 
 (-1.26) (-1.26) (-1.15)  (-1.11) (-1.11) (-1.01) 
l_rated 0.028 0.027 0.022  0.030 0.030 0.031 
 (0.63) (0.61) (0.47)  (0.69) (0.68) (0.66) 
l_zscore_dum -0.088 -0.089 -0.066  -0.068 -0.068 -0.047 
 (-1.91) (-1.92) (-1.36)  (-1.43) (-1.43) (-0.94) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 7,387 7,387 7,387  7,388 7,388 7,388 
adj. R2 0.175 0.175 0.175  0.174 0.175 0.175 
 
 
 
2.3.3.3. Headquarter Relocations  
In this section we exploit change in institutional investor proximity after firms’ 
headquarter relocations to further examine the causal effect of local institutional 
monitoring on maturity of new debt issues. Although firms may change headquarter 
locations due to a variety of reasons, it is reasonable to argue that firms’ headquarter 
relocations represent quasi-exogenous shocks to their institutional investor proximity.  
To construct the headquarter relocation sample for firms in the new debt issuance 
sample, we track their headquarter changes and define headquarter relocations in three 
alternative ways: as moving out of state; moving more than 100 miles; or moving more 
than 200 miles. We then require firms to have debt issues within the period of two years 
before and two years after the relocations. The period of two years is selected to allow 
sufficient time for monitoring institutions to impact firms’ debt maturity policies, while 
minimizing confounding effects of other factors on debt maturity. The resulting sample 
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has only 24 (25) relocations if relocation is defined as moving out of state or moving more 
than 200 miles (moving more than 100 miles).14  
We first perform a univariate analysis. We focus on firms that have (do not have) 
local institutional investors before relocation and do not have (have) local institutional 
investors after relocation, and compute within-firm differences of the maturity of new debt 
issues across the changes. As show in Panel A of Table 2.7, firms with local institutional 
investors (local =1) issue shorter maturity debt than firms without local institutional 
investors (local=0), and the average difference in debt maturity is about 28% for firms 
moving out of state,15 longer than 3 years, although it is only statistically significant at the 
.10 level under a one-tailed test, most likely due to the small sample size.  
We then conduct a multivariate regression analysis. We regress changes in the 
average maturity of new debt issues before and after headquarter relocations on changes 
in institutional proximity measures and control variables over the same time period. The 
results are in Panel B of Table 2.7. When relocation is defined as moving out of state, 
changes in institutional proximity measures are significantly related to changes in maturity 
of new debt issues, and the negative (positive) coefficients on changes in local and 
local_inst (min_dist) suggest that firms with more or closer local institutional investors 
following headquarter relocation issue shorter maturity debt. The results under alternative 
definitions of relocation are similar, although the significance levels are reduced.  
                                               
14 To be clear, there are over 170 headquarter relocations among the firms in our sample, but the 
overwhelming majority are not sufficiently near in time to new debt issues to permit a tight test. 
15 Note that the maturities are in logs. So a difference of 0.34 in sw_maturity is translated into 28% difference 
in raw values of maturity. When raw values of maturity are used in this test, the difference in debt maturity 
is 3.3 years. 
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Table 2.7. Maturity of New Debt Issues:  Headquarter Relocations as Quasi-exogenous 
Shocks  
This table reports analysis of maturity of new debt issues surrounding firms’ headquarter relocations. A 
headquarter relocation is defined as moving out of state, moving more than 100 miles, or moving more than 
200 miles. Maturity of new debt issues is measured by the issue size-weighted average maturity 
(sw_maturity, in log, abbreviated as sw_mat in Panel A) or the equal-weighted average maturity 
(ew_maturity, in log, abbreviated as ew_mat in Panel A). Panel A performs univariate analyses, focusing on 
firms that have (do not have) local institutional investors before relocation and do not have (have) local 
institutional investors after relocation, and comparing maturity of new debt issues of firms without (local=0) 
and with (local=1) local institutional investors. Panel B reports results of OLS regressions of change in 
maturity of new debt issues on changes in institutional proximity measures and control variables surrounding 
firms’ headquarter relocations. Only the coefficients on institutional proximity measures are reported. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses (standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity).  
Panel A: Univariate Analysis 
 Moving out of state  Moving >100 miles  Moving >200 miles 
 sw_mat ew_mat  sw_mat ew_mat  sw_mat ew_mat 
local=0 1.89 1.88  1.88 1.87  1.92 1.91 
         
local=1 1.55 1.57  1.56 1.60  1.55 1.60 
         
Difference 0.34 0.31  0.32 0.27  0.37 0.31 
         
p-value of t test 0.11 0.14  0.17 0.21  0.17 0.22 
(Ha: diff>0)         
Obs. 20 20  16 16  14 14 
 
 
Panel B: OLS Regression 
 sw_maturity  ew_maturity 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
I. Moving out of state (Obs: 24) 
ch_local -0.730    -0.743   
 (-2.07)    (-2.14)   
ch_local_inst  -0.643    -0.645  
  (-2.03)    (-2.04)  
ch_min_dist   0.672    0.750 
   (2.40)    (2.74) 
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Table 2.7 Continued 
 sw_maturity  ew_maturity 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
II. Moving more than 100 miles (Obs.: 25) 
ch_local -0.623    -0.637   
 (-1.80)    (-1.79)   
ch_local_inst  -0.513    -0.521  
  (-1.58)    (-1.56)  
ch_min_dist   0.069    0.156 
   (0.16)    (0.36) 
III. Moving more than 200 miles (Obs.: 24) 
ch_local -0.609    -0.621   
 (-1.89)    (-1.95)   
ch_local_inst  -0.505    -0.511  
  (-1.69)    (-1.73)  
ch_min_dist   -0.267    -0.188 
   (-0.43)    (-0.30) 
Change in controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
Although the small sample size limits the inference of our analyses, the results in 
this section using headquarter relocations as exogenous shocks to institutional proximity 
further support the causal effect of local institutional monitoring on debt maturity.  
2.3.3.4. Nearest-neighbor Matching Estimator 
Thus far we have used pooled OLS regressions to estimate the relation between 
institutional proximity and maturity of new debt issues. When the dummy variable local 
is the measure of institutional proximity, we compare the maturity of new debt issues 
between two groups, firms with and without local institutional investors. Ideally, we want 
firms in the two groups to be as similar as possible except for existence of local 
institutional investors. In particular, we want firms to be in the same locations but have 
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some firms with local institutional investors and some firm without. Controlling more 
tightly for location allows us to avoid concerns about pure local-specific effects. For 
example, suppose that institutional investors cluster in areas where there are also large 
numbers of commercial banks. Further suppose that, all else equal, firms are more likely 
to borrow from local banks. Given that bank loans typically have shorter maturity than 
other private debt and public debt, firms headquartered in areas with high concentrations 
of institutional investors and commercial banks would exhibit a correlation between local 
investors and debt maturity driven solely by the joint location of both institutional 
investors and commercial banks.  
To address this and similar concerns, we perform a nearest-neighbor matching 
estimation. Each year for each firm with local institutional investors, we find a matching 
firm without local institutional investors but from the same state and same industry by 
matching on the ownership of monitoring institutions, firm size, leverage, asset maturity, 
abnormal earnings, and rated firm dummy.16 Any “commercial bank effects” or other 
purely area-specific effects should be netted out because each matched pair of firms is in 
the same area, but differs on whether they have local institutional investors. We estimate 
the average treatment effect using the Abadie-Imbens bias-corrected matching estimator 
(Abadie and Imbens (2011)). Given the earlier results documenting the importance of 
SOX, we estimate results separate for the pre and post-SOX periods.  
  
                                               
16 We choose the matching variables based on the pooled OLS regression results in Table 5. Variables that 
are significantly related to debt maturity are the matching variables.  
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Table 2.8. Nearest-neighbor Matching Estimation 
This table presents nearest-neighbor matching analysis. Each year for each firm with local institutional 
investors, we find a matching firm without local institutional investors from the same state and same industry 
by matching on the ownership of monitoring institutions, firm size, leverage, asset maturity, abnormal 
earnings, and rated firm dummy. In each section, the first row reports the Abadie-Imbens bias-corrected 
average treatment effect (ATE) of local institutional investors on maturity of new debt issues using nearest 
neighbor matching estimation, the second row reports z-statistics (in parentheses) of ATE estimates, and the 
third row reports the z-statistics of Wilcoxon signed ranks test of maturity of new debt issues of matched 
firms with and without local institutional investors. Maturity of new debt issues is measured by the issue 
size-weighted average maturity (sw_maturity, in log) or the equal-weighted average maturity (ew_maturity, 
in log). 
   sw_maturity  ew_maturity 
I. Before 2003 ATE  -0.066  -0.059 
   (<=2002) z-statistics of ATE  (-2.09)  (-1.87) 
 z-statistics of Wilcoxon test  (-3.93)  (-3.18) 
      
II. After 2003 ATE  -0.013  -0.018 
    (>=2003) z-statistics of ATE  (-0.45)  (-0.59) 
 z-statistics of Wilcoxon test  (-0.67)  (-0.99) 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 2.8, the average treatment effect is significantly negative before 
implementation of SOX in 2002, but insignificant after SOX, suggesting that compared 
with similar firms without local institutional investors, firms with local institutional 
investors issue shorter maturity debt, and that the effect diminishes after SOX. These 
results are consistent with the findings from pooled OLS regressions. 
In addition, we perform Wilcoxon signed ranks tests of equality of maturities of new 
debt issues of the matched pairs of firms with and without local institutional investors, and 
the z-statistics of the tests are shown Table 2.8. Consistent with the average treatment 
effect estimation, firms with local institutional investors issue significantly shorter 
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maturity debt than the matched firms without local institutional investors, but the 
difference diminishes in the post-SOX period.  
Overall results of the nearest neighbor matching analyses suggest that firms with 
local institutional investors issue shorter maturity debt and the result is not driven solely 
by pure local-specific effects.  
2.3.3.5. Equity Agency Costs or Debt Agency Costs 
As we note in the introduction, short debt maturity can potentially reduce debt 
agency costs that stockholders may otherwise have to bear and equity agency costs. 
Because the two effects are not mutually exclusive and both predict that local institutional 
investors would prefer shorter debt maturity, it is difficult to conceive of tests to sort out 
whether one or both effects drive the results. With that caveat, we examine a case where 
equity agency costs should be relatively greater. Specifically, we use CEO-Chair duality 
as a proxy for the magnitude of potential equity agency problems. CEOs who are also 
chairman of the board of directors have more power than those who are not chairman. This 
concentration of power puts CEOs in a position with less internal monitoring, so it can 
potentially exacerbate conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers, resulting 
in more severe equity agency problems and increasing the need for external monitoring 
by institutional shareholders. Risk-averse CEOs with undiversified holdings of equity and 
human capital in a firm and with significant power might reject projects that are more 
profitable but riskier, or might adopt financial policies (e.g., sub-optimally low leverage). 
Short-term lenders are unlikely to resolve these problems, and indeed may worsen them. 
In contrast, powerful CEOs may also consume excess perks and/or exert low effort, both 
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Table 2.9. Equity Agency Costs vs. Debt Agency Costs 
This table reports results of pooled OLS regressions of maturity of new debt issues on institutional proximity 
including interaction terms between institutional proximity measures and CEO-Chair duality. The dependent 
variables are the issue size-weighted average maturity (sw_maturity, in log) in Panel A and the equal-
weighted average maturity (ew_maturity, in log) in Panel B, respectively. duality is the dummy variable for 
CEO-Chair duality. Institutional distance measure, min_dist, is standardized (mean is set to zero and 
standard deviation is one). All control variables are also lagged one year (denoted by prefix l_). Industry 
and year fixed effects are included, but their coefficients are not reported. T-statistics in parentheses are 
adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered by firm.  
 Panel A: sw_maturity  Panel B: ew_maturity 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
l_local 0.060    0.040   
 (0.71)    (0.47)   
l_local×duality -0.183    -0.184   
 (-1.85)    (-1.85)   
l_local_inst  0.062    0.047  
  (0.65)    (0.45)  
l_local_inst×duality  -0.144    -0.147  
  (-1.83)    (-1.84)  
l_min_dist   -0.048    -0.059 
   (-1.14)    (-1.27) 
l_min_dist×duality   0.097    0.101 
   (1.77)    (1.75) 
l_duality 0.011 0.006 -0.013  0.003 0.000 -0.022 
 (0.20) (0.11) (-0.25)  (0.06) (0.01) (-0.41) 
l_top5_io -0.613 -0.621 -0.616  -0.765 -0.767 -0.770 
 (-2.02) (-2.05) (-2.04)  (-2.52) (-2.52) (-2.52) 
l_leverage 0.543 0.535 0.520  0.500 0.489 0.478 
 (2.73) (2.69) (2.63)  (2.47) (2.41) (2.38) 
l_lsize -0.172 -0.178 -0.158  -0.325 -0.335 -0.314 
 (-0.76) (-0.79) (-0.70)  (-1.42) (-1.46) (-1.36) 
l_lsize2 0.008 0.008 0.007  0.018 0.019 0.018 
 (0.58) (0.60) (0.50)  (1.39) (1.42) (1.31) 
l_asset_mat 0.004 0.005 0.005  0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (1.31) (1.35) (1.35)  (1.61) (1.64) (1.67) 
l_mb -0.005 -0.004 -0.002  -0.012 -0.012 -0.009 
 (-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.07)  (-0.45) (-0.45) (-0.34) 
l_term -0.074 -0.074 -0.072  -0.103 -0.102 -0.098 
 (-1.59) (-1.58) (-1.53)  (-2.14) (-2.12) (-2.01) 
l_abnearn 0.137 0.138 0.123  0.177 0.182 0.162 
 (1.22) (1.24) (1.08)  (1.51) (1.57) (1.37) 
l_volatility -0.419 -0.424 -0.423  -0.759 -0.770 -0.746 
 (-0.49) (-0.49) (-0.49)  (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.84) 
l_reg_dum -0.139 -0.151 -0.134  -0.123 -0.136 -0.123 
 (-0.75) (-0.82) (-0.70)  (-0.69) (-0.77) (-0.67) 
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Table 2.9 Continued    
 Panel A: sw_maturity  Panel B: ew_maturity 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
l_rated 0.203 0.205 0.213  0.202 0.204 0.214 
 (2.96) (2.97) (3.07)  (2.94) (2.95) (3.07) 
l_zscore_dum -0.154 -0.156 -0.159  -0.143 -0.146 -0.148 
 (-1.73) (-1.75) (-1.78)  (-1.53) (-1.57) (-1.58) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1,973 1,973 1,973  1,973 1,973 1,973 
adj. R2 0.161 0.161 0.160  0.161 0.161 0.159 
 
 
 
of which harm stockholders and debtholders. Monitoring and discipline by short-term 
lenders would be expected to reduce these problems, and potentially generate spillover 
benefits for a firm’s stockholders. 
We define a dummy variable, duality, which is set to one for firms whose CEOs are 
also chairman and zero otherwise. We interact duality with the institutional geographic 
proximity measures and include the interaction terms in the regressions for the maturity 
of new debt issues. The results are shown in Table 2.9. The coefficients on the interaction 
terms between duality and local or local_inst are significantly negative and the coefficient 
on the interaction term between duality and min_dist is significantly positive. Strikingly, 
the coefficients on the stand-alone geographic proximity measures are not significantly 
different from zero. Thus, the impact of institutional proximity on the maturity of new 
debt issues obtains only for firms with dual CEO-Chair, and thus the potential for more 
severe equity agency problems. The result suggests that the potential reduction of equity 
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agency costs (at least in part) drives the relation between debt maturity and local 
institutional investors.17  
In summary, the positive effect of local institutional investors on short maturity debt 
found for existing debt maturity structure holds for new debt issues, and the causal effect 
of local institutional monitoring on maturity of new debt issues is identified using SOX as 
a natural experiment and headquarter relocations as exogenous shock to institutional 
proximity. The nearest neighbor matching analyses suggest that the effect is not driven 
solely by the joint location of both institutional investors and commercial banks. The 
motivation to reduce equity agency costs at least partially drives the effect. 
 
2.4. Local Monitoring or Superior Information 
An alternative explanation for our finding is that local institutional investors do not 
influence firms’ debt maturity structures, but rather simply choose to invest in local firms 
with shorter debt maturities. Knowing that short-term debt enhances lender monitoring 
and can provide more effective discipline of managers, local institutional investors may 
simply seek out those firms that they know (based on their information advantage) would 
benefit from such monitoring and discipline. To assess the plausibility of an information-
based explanation for our finding, we conduct additional tests in this section.  
                                               
17 Our empirical results suggest that monitoring by local institutional investors and monitoring effect of short 
maturity debt are complimentary, at least for firms with more severe equity agency problems. 
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2.4.1. Regulation Fair Disclosure as a Quasi-natural Experiment 
We first use the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in 2000 as 
a natural experiment to explore an information-based explanation for our finding. 
Gintschel and Markov (2004) find that Reg FD has been effective in reducing the 
informativeness of analyst information output. Bernile, Kumar, and Sulaeman (2011) 
show that Reg FD eliminated the information advantage of local institutional investors. 
Therefore, if our finding reflects solely a superior information advantage of local investors 
that permits them to invest in firms that benefit from shorter debt maturity, we would 
expect the effect of institutional geographic proximity on debt maturity to weaken or even 
disappear in the post-Reg FD period.  
We apply a difference-in-difference estimation method to our new debt issue sample 
to examine this information hypothesis. Since Reg FD was implemented in October 2000, 
we define a post-Reg FD dummy, post_reg, which equals to one for years after 2000 (and 
before 2003)18 and zero for years before 2000. We interact the dummy variable with each 
of the three institutional proximity measures, and include the interaction terms, as well as 
the post-Reg FD dummy variable, as additional explanatory variables in the specifications 
for maturity of new debt issues as shown in Table 2.5. An information advantage 
explanation for our finding would predict significantly positive coefficients on the 
interaction terms local×post_reg and local_instpost_reg and a significantly negative 
coefficient on the interaction term min_dist×post_reg.      
                                               
18 The sample period for this test is ended in 2002 because our earlier results show that the effect of 
institutional proximity on debt maturity diminishes in the post-SOX period (after 2002). 
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Table 2.10. Active Monitoring or Information Advantage? Evidence from Reg FD 
This table reports results of OLS regressions that use difference-in-difference method to test the information 
advantage based explanation. The dependent variables are the issue size-weighted average maturity 
(sw_maturity, in log) in Panel A and the equal-weighted average maturity (ew_maturity, in log) in Panel B, 
respectively. The institutional distance measure, min_dist, is standardized (mean is set to zero and standard 
deviation is one). post_reg is a dummy variable that equals to one for all years after 2000 (and before 2003) 
and zero for all years before 2000. All independent variables are lagged one year (denoted by prefix l_).  
Industry and year fixed effects are included, but their coefficients are not reported. The industry 
classifications are defined based on 2-digit SIC code. T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for both 
heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered by firm. 
 Panel A: sw_maturity  Panel B: ew_maturity 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
l_local -0.115    -0.107   
 (-1.93)    (-1.75)   
l_local×post_reg 0.158    0.131   
 (1.31)    (1.10)   
l_local_inst  -0.073    -0.076  
  (-1.78)    (-1.79)  
l_local_inst×post_reg  0.091    0.066  
  (1.07)    (0.85)  
l_min_dist   0.057    0.051 
   (1.97)    (1.76) 
l_min_dist×post_reg   -0.011    -0.004 
   (-0.20)    (-0.07) 
post_reg -0.588 -0.593 -0.544  -0.491 -0.502 -0.454 
 (-3.65) (-3.81) (-3.47)  (-3.13) (-3.59) (-2.97) 
l_top5_io -0.695 -0.615 -0.698  -0.769 -0.684 -0.710 
 (-2.81) (-2.54) (-2.82)  (-3.12) (-2.85) (-2.97) 
l_leverage 0.542 0.548 0.522  0.549 0.546 0.535 
 (3.86) (3.97) (3.48)  (3.83) (3.84) (3.45) 
l_lsize 0.385 0.391 0.380  0.305 0.313 0.307 
 (3.09) (3.18) (3.02)  (2.47) (2.54) (2.40) 
l_lsize2 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024  -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 
 (-2.94) (-2.97) (-2.92)  (-2.13) (-2.15) (-2.12) 
l_asset_mat 0.008 0.007 0.011  0.009 0.008 0.012 
 (2.62) (2.44) (3.21)  (2.80) (2.63) (3.41) 
l_mb -0.028 -0.027 -0.033  -0.038 -0.039 -0.045 
 (-1.10) (-1.08) (-1.34)  (-1.42) (-1.45) (-1.75) 
l_term 0.004 0.012 0.157  -0.014 -0.006 0.161 
 (0.06) (0.16) (6.06)  (-0.19) (-0.08) (6.42) 
l_abnearn 0.184 0.165 0.205  0.194 0.176 0.217 
 (2.26) (2.03) (2.43)  (2.33) (2.11) (2.61) 
l_volatility -0.220 -0.325 -0.361  -0.414 -0.528 -0.562 
 (-0.33) (-0.49) (-0.56)  (-0.63) (-0.80) (-0.86) 
l_reg_dum -0.386 -0.427 -0.403  -0.347 -0.397 -0.364 
 (-1.96) (-2.19) (-2.22)  (-1.84) (-2.10) (-2.09) 
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Table 2.10 Continued 
 Panel A: sw_maturity  Panel B: ew_maturity 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
l_rated 0.054 0.048 0.018  0.052 0.047 0.026 
 (0.71) (0.68) (0.22)  (0.69) (0.69) (0.34) 
l_zscore_dum -0.064 -0.065 -0.025  -0.016 -0.016 0.021 
 (-0.86) (-0.88) (-0.34)  (-0.22) (-0.22) (0.28) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,354 4,354 4,354  4,355 4,355 4,355 
adj. R2 0.227 0.225 0.225  0.225 0.225 0.225 
 
 
 
The estimation results are shown in Table 2.10. In all specifications, the coefficients 
on the interaction terms are not significantly different from zero. The result suggests that 
local monitoring institutions have a significant impact on maturity of new debt issues even 
after the implementation of Reg FD, and the impact has not significantly weakened in the 
post-Reg FD period, which is not consistent with the information advantage explanation. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that our findings are simply driven by the informational advantage 
of local institutions in choosing firms that benefit from short debt maturity.  
2.4.2. Information Asymmetry Hypothesis 
Our second test for an information-based explanation is to examine whether the 
effect of institutional geographic proximity on debt maturity is stronger for firms with 
greater information asymmetry, such as non-S&P 500 firms. Previous studies show that 
investors exploit their superior information more effectively among firms with greater 
information asymmetry, and local institutional investors are more likely to exploit their 
local information advantage for firms with greater information asymmetry (e.g., Schultz 
(2010)). Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) use S&P 500 status as the proxy for information 
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asymmetry and find that excess returns to investing locally are even larger among non-
S&P 500 stocks, for which information asymmetries between local and nonlocal investors 
may be largest. If our finding merely reflects local information advantage of institutional 
investors, we would expect that the effect of institutional geographic proximity on debt 
maturity is stronger for firms not in the S&P 500 index, i.e., firms with greater information 
asymmetry.  
We interact the institutional proximity measures with the S&P 500 dummy, sp500, 
which is set to one for S&P 500 firms and zero otherwise, and repeat the analyses of debt 
maturity structure (st3) and maturity of new debt issues by including the interaction terms 
as additional explanatory variables. The results are shown in Table 2.11. Panel A reports 
the dynamic system GMM estimators for debt maturity structure (st3), and Panel B reports 
the pooled OLS estimators for maturity of new debt issues. In all specifications, the 
coefficients on the interaction terms are insignificant, suggesting that the effect of 
institutional geographic proximity on debt maturity is not stronger for firms with greater 
information asymmetry. The results do not support an information advantage based 
explanation for our findings.  
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Table 2.11. Active Monitoring or Information Advantage? Testing Information Asymmetry 
Hypothesis 
This table reports results of testing the information asymmetry hypothesis. Panel A shows the results of 
dynamic panel system GMM estimation of relation between debt maturity structure (st3) and institutional 
geographic proximity, and Panel B shows the results of pooled OLS regressions of maturity of new debt 
issues on lagged institutional geographic proximity. Institutional distance measure, min_dist, is standardized 
(mean is set to zero and standard deviation is one). Interaction terms between the (lagged) institutional 
proximity measures and sp500 dummy are included as additional explanatory variables. In Panel A, the 
dependent variable is st3. Firm, industry and year fixed effects are included, but their coefficients are not 
reported. The industry classifications are defined based on 2-digit SIC code. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
In Panel B, the dependent variables are the issue size-weighted average maturity (sw_maturity, in log) or 
the equal-weighted average maturity (ew_maturity, in log). All control variables are also lagged one year 
(denoted by prefix l_). Industry and year fixed effects are included, but their coefficients are not reported. 
T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered by firm. 
 
Table 2.11, Panel A. System GMM Estimates of Dynamic Panel Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
local 0.194   
 (2.75)   
local×sp500 -0.182   
 (-1.33)   
local_inst  0.129  
  (2.48)  
local_inst×sp500  -0.081  
  (-0.92)  
min_dist   -0.083 
   (-2.71) 
min_dist×sp500   -0.018 
   (-0.24) 
sp500 0.120 0.067 0.128 
 (0.80) (0.44) (0.67) 
top5_io 0.113 0.126 0.085 
 (0.70) (0.79) (0.48) 
leverage 0.008 0.013 0.077 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.65) 
lsize -0.118 -0.120 -0.131 
 (-2.62) (-2.73) (-2.17) 
lsize2 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (1.91) (1.99) (1.35) 
asset_mat 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.98) (0.93) (0.46) 
mb -0.012 -0.009 -0.011 
 (-0.50) (-0.39) (-0.47) 
term 0.057 0.038 0.034 
 (2.36) (1.59) (1.36) 
abnearn -0.258 -0.265 -0.280 
 (-4.31) (-4.41) (-4.29) 
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Table 2.11 Continued    
 (1) (2) (3) 
volatility -0.207 -0.156 -0.100 
 (-0.33) (-0.26) (-0.16) 
reg_dum -1.704 -1.531 -1.859 
 (-2.42) (-2.32) (-2.69) 
rated -0.087 -0.087 -0.089 
 (-2.26) (-2.25) (-2.10) 
zscore_dum -0.072 -0.057 -0.044 
 (-1.06) (-0.88) (-0.64) 
lag_st3 0.518 0.531 0.519 
 (5.76) (5.74) (5.62) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.948 0.903 0.944 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value) 0.421 0.327 0.585 
Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity (p-value) 0.240 0.137 0.486 
 
Table 2.11, Panel B. Pooled OLS Estimates of Maturity of New Debt Issues  
 sw_maturity  ew_maturity 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
l_local -0.144    -0.138   
 (-2.09)    (-1.98)   
l_local×sp500 0.097    0.097   
 (0.76)    (0.78)   
l_local_inst  -0.072    -0.069  
  (-1.75)    (-1.69)  
l_local_inst×sp500  0.019    0.073  
  (0.17)    (0.95)  
l_min_dist   0.066    0.062 
   (2.20)    (2.08) 
l_min_dist×sp500   -0.053    -0.057 
   (-1.07)    (-1.17) 
l_sp500 0.265 0.286 0.277  0.256 0.244 0.262 
 (2.82) (2.94) (2.57)  (2.87) (1.97) (2.45) 
l_top5_io -0.869 -0.790 -0.809  -0.935 -0.805 -0.848 
 (-3.52) (-3.24) (-3.83)  (-3.81) (-3.81) (-4.06) 
l_leverage 0.640 0.623 0.649  0.630 0.690 0.651 
 (3.90) (3.84) (4.93)  (3.77) (4.92) (4.79) 
l_lsize 0.386 0.430 0.425  0.328 0.299 0.343 
 (2.70) (2.96) (3.69)  (2.32) (2.55) (2.97) 
l_lsize2 -0.027 -0.030 -0.029  -0.022 -0.019 -0.022 
 (-2.91) (-3.07) (-3.81)  (-2.40) (-2.51) (-2.90) 
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Table 2.11 Continued 
 sw_maturity  ew_maturity 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
l_asset_mat 0.013 0.012 0.009  0.014 0.011 0.010 
 (3.67) (3.44) (2.79)  (3.87) (3.30) (3.09) 
l_mb -0.017 -0.014 -0.018  -0.031 -0.029 -0.030 
 (-0.54) (-0.46) (-0.78)  (-0.99) (-1.24) (-1.29) 
l_term 0.058 0.087 -0.063  0.059 -0.073 -0.072 
 (0.64) (0.93) (-1.65)  (0.65) (-1.86) (-1.85) 
l_abnearn 0.264 0.242 0.223  0.239 0.224 0.222 
 (2.33) (2.08) (2.79)  (2.03) (2.88) (2.75) 
l_volatility -0.042 -0.141 0.010  -0.189 -0.039 -0.092 
 (-0.05) (-0.16) (0.02)  (-0.22) (-0.06) (-0.15) 
l_reg_dum -0.309 -0.395 -0.383  -0.298 -0.336 -0.332 
 (-1.51) (-1.93) (-1.91)  (-1.40) (-1.68) (-1.70) 
l_rated 0.019 0.013 0.028  0.028 0.054 0.043 
 (0.24) (0.17) (0.40)  (0.36) (0.79) (0.63) 
l_zscore_dum -0.083 -0.090 -0.070  -0.028 -0.025 -0.021 
 (-1.03) (-1.09) (-1.06)  (-0.34) (-0.37) (-0.32) 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,354 4,354 4,354  4,355 4,355 4,355 
adj. R2 0.235 0.235 0.233  0.233 0.237 0.236 
 
 
 
2.5. Robustness Checks 
In this section we perform several robustness checks to assess whether our main 
finding is robust to alternative measures of institutional proximity, alternative definition 
of monitoring institutions, clustering of local institutions and banks, and inclusion of 
additional control variables. 
2.5.1. Alternative Measure of Institutional Proximity 
The first robustness check is about the institutional proximity measures. One of our 
primary measures is the shortest distance between the monitoring institutions and the 
investee firm. An alternative measure would be the average distance between monitoring 
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institutions (i.e., the top five independent institutions) and the investee firm, top5_dist. 
Sections I of Table 2.12 report the results of dynamic panel system GMM estimation of 
the relation between st3 and top5_dist (Panel A) and pooled OLS regressions of maturity 
of new debt issues (Panel B). The average distance, top5_dist, is significantly negatively 
related to st3 and significantly positively related to maturity of new debt issues, suggesting 
that firms with closer monitoring institutions have a higher proportion of short-term debt 
and issue shorter maturity debt. The results are qualitatively the same as our main finding.  
2.5.2. Alternative Definition of Monitoring Institutions 
Our next robustness check is regarding how to define monitoring institutions. In our 
main analysis, we classify independent institutions as those that are (1) independent from 
corporate management (i.e., they have no business relationships with the firm) as defined 
by Brickley et al. (1988) and (2) classified as dedicated or quasi-indexer institutions by 
Bushee (2001). We then define monitoring institutions as the top five independent 
institutions in terms of the size of their shareholdings. Alternatively, we define monitoring 
institutions as those that are top five institutions in terms of the size of their shareholdings 
and also meet the criteria (1) and (2) as stated above.19 We then constructed the ownership 
and proximity measures of monitoring institutions under the alternative definition, and 
repeat our main analyses. Sections II of Table 2.12 report the dynamic panel system GMM  
  
                                               
19 According to the alternative definition, the monitoring institutions are among the top five of all 
institutional investors based on the size of their shareholdings, but the number of monitoring institutions 
may be less than 5.  The monitoring institutions based on the original definition in the paper are the top five 
among all independent institutions based on the size of their shareholdings, but may not be the top five 
among all institutions.  
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Table 2.12. Robustness Checks: Alternative Measure of Institutional Proximity and 
Alternative Definition of Monitoring Institutions 
This table reports results of robustness checks by using alternative measure of institutional proximity and 
alternative definition of monitoring institutions. Panel A reports dynamic panel system GMM estimation of 
the relation between debt maturity structure (st3) and institutional proximity, and Panel B reports pooled 
OLS estimates of relation between maturity of new debt issues and institutional proximity with sample 
period ending in 2002. In Session I of each panel, the average distance between monitoring institutions and 
the investee firm, top5_dist, is the alternative measure of institutional proximity. In Session II of each panel, 
the institutional proximity measures, local, local_inst, and min_dist, are constructed under an alternative 
definition of monitoring institutions. We first identify the largest five institutional investors in terms of the 
size of shareholdings, and then define monitoring institutions as those that are among the top five 
institutions, are independent from corporate management as defined by Brickley et al. (1998), and have a 
long-term investment as classified as dedicated or quasi-indexer institutions by Bushee (2001). The distance 
measures, min_dist and top5_dist, are standardized (mean is set to zero and standard deviation is one). In 
Panel A, the dependent variable is st3. In Panel B, the dependent variables are the issue size-weighted 
average maturity (sw_maturity, in log) or the equal-weighted average maturity (ew_maturity, in log), and 
independent variables are lagged one year (denoted by prefix l_). T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for 
both heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered by firm. Only the estimation results for institutional 
proximity measures are reported, and control variables are included in estimations but not reported. 
 
Table 2.12, Panel A. System GMM Estimates of Dynamic Panel Model 
 I. Average distance as 
proximity measure 
 II. Alternative definition of 
monitoring institutions 
 (1)  (1) (2) (3) 
top5_dist -0.057     
 (-2.06)     
local   0.146   
   (1.96)   
local_inst    0.112  
    (1.83)  
min_dist     -0.055 
     (-2.09) 
Control variables Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.764  0.685 0.766 0.642 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.463  0.112 0.125 0.145 
Diff-in-Hansen test (p-value) 0.248  0.496 0.432 0.284 
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Table 2.12 Continued 
Table 2.12, Panel B. Pooled OLS Estimates of Maturity of New Debt Issues 
 I. Average distance as 
proximity measure 
 II. Alternative definition of monitoring institutions 
 sw_mat  ew_mat  sw_maturity  ew_maturity 
     (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
l_top5_dist 0.049  0.046         
 (1.84)  (1.73)         
l_local     -0.140    -0.128   
     (-2.09)    (-1.93)   
l_local_inst      -0.141    -0.135  
      (-2.24)    (-2.17)  
l_min_dist       0.063    0.058 
       (2.10)    (1.88) 
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
dummy 
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 4,354  4,355  4,140 4,140 4,140  4,141 4,141 4,141 
adj. R2 0.185  0.182  0.253 0.252 0.252  0.249 0.247 0.247 
 
 
 
estimation of the relation between debt maturity structure (st3) and the institutional 
proximity measures (Panel A), and the results of pooled OLS estimation of the relation 
between maturity of new debt issues and the institutional proximity measures (Panel B). 
The results are all qualitatively similar to our main results, and our finding is robust to the 
alternative definition of monitoring institutions. 
2.5.3. Importance of California and New York 
We next examine whether the results are driven by firms and investors located in 
California and New York because these states have high concentrations of both. We 
exclude firms located in the states of California and New York, and perform system 
dynamic GMM estimation of existing debt maturity structure and pooled OLS regressions 
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of maturity of new debt issues. The results shown in Table 2.13 (Sections I) indicate that 
our main findings are not driven by firms and investors in California and New York. 
2.5.4. Inclusion of Additional Control Variables 
In the last robustness check, we add to our main specification additional control 
variables that may be related to debt maturity structure. Datta et al. (2005) and Brockman 
et al. (2010) show that executive incentives related variables such as CEO ownership, 
Delta and Vega can affect debt maturity. We collect CEO compensation and ownership 
information from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database, compute Delta, Vega and 
CEO ownership, and repeat our main analyses with Delta, Vega and CEO ownership 
included as additional control variables. The results are shown in Table 2.13. Panel A, 
Section II reports the two-step dynamic system GMM estimation of the relation between 
debt maturity and institutional proximity, and Panel B, Section II reports the pooled OLS 
estimation of the relation between maturity of new debt issues and institutional proximity. 
The coefficients on all of the three measures of institutional proximity are statistically 
significant with the same signs as those shown in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5. Therefore, our 
results are robust to inclusion of additional executive incentive related control variables.  
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Table 2.13. Additional Robustness Checks: Excluding Firms Located in California and New 
York and Controlling for Variables Related to Executive Incentives 
This table reports results of robustness checks by (I) excluding firms located in states of California (CA) 
and New York (NY) and (II) controlling for additional variables related to executive incentives, including 
Delta, Vega, and CEO ownership. Panel A reports dynamic panel system GMM estimation of the relation 
between debt maturity structure (st3) and institutional proximity, and Panel B reports pooled OLS estimates 
of relation between maturity of new debt issues and institutional proximity. The institutional distance 
measure, min_dist, is standardized (mean is set to zero and standard deviation is one). delta is the change in 
the value of CEO’s stock and option portfolio due to a 1% increase in stock price (in logs). vega is the 
change in value of CEO’s option portfolio due to 1% change in volatility of stock return. own is the fraction 
of the firm’s shares held by its CEO. In Panel A, the dependent variable is st3. Firm, industry and year fixed 
effects are included, but their coefficients are not reported. The industry classifications are defined based on 
2-digit SIC code. T-statistics are in parentheses. p-values of AR(2) test, Hansen test, and Diff-in-Hansen test 
are reported. In Panel B, the dependent variables are the issue size-weighted average maturity (sw_maturity, 
in log) or the equal-weighted average maturity (ew_maturity, in log). Independent variables are lagged one 
year (denoted by prefix l_). T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and within 
correlation clustered by firm. Only the estimation results for institutional proximity measures and incentive 
related variables are reported, and other control variables are included in estimations but not reported. 
 
Table 2.13, Panel A. System GMM Estimates of Dynamic Panel Model 
 I. Excluding CA and NY 
firms 
 II. Controlling for incentive 
related variables 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
local 0.164    0.183   
 (2.09)    (2.54)   
local_inst  0.130    0.108  
  (2.25)    (2.66)  
min_dist   -0.074    -0.064 
   (-2.17)    (-2.31) 
delta     -0.021 -0.015 -0.004 
     (-1.82) (-1.70) (-1.67) 
vega     0.000 0.016 0.012 
     (0.74) (0.99) (0.75) 
own     0.010 0.008 0.001 
     (1.77) (1.75) (1.72) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.953 0.962 0.702  0.136 0.147 0.189 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.675 0.711 0.867  0.671 0.739 0.169 
Diff-in-Hansen test (p-value) 0.590 0.585 0.771  0.540 0.573 0.138 
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Table 2.13 Continued 
Table 2.13, Panel B. Pooled OLS Estimates of Maturity of New Debt Issues 
 sw_maturity  ew_maturity 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
I. Excluding CA and NY firms 
l_local -0.155    -0.147   
 (-2.24)    (-2.10)   
l_local_inst  -0.105    -0.107  
  (-2.17)    (-2.28)  
l_min_dist   0.067    0.060 
   (2.25)    (2.00) 
II. Controlling for incentive related variables 
l_local -0.110    -0.097   
 (-1.87)    (-1.75)   
l_local_inst  -0.082    -0.087  
  (-1.86)    (-1.99)  
l_min_dist   0.046    0.054 
   (1.82)    (1.74) 
l_delta 0.076 0.076 0.123  0.062 0.078 0.132 
 (2.58) (2.59) (4.81)  (2.40) (2.62) (3.92) 
l_vega -0.040 -0.040 -0.071  -0.020 -0.041 -0.109 
 (-1.64) (-1.66) (-3.70)  (-1.00) (-1.67) (-3.66) 
l_own -0.012 -0.012 -0.018  -0.013 -0.014 -0.022 
 (-2.15) (-2.11) (-3.20)  (-2.41) (-2.31) (-3.32) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
We examine the relation between the geographic proximity of institutional investors 
and the maturity structure of corporate debt. Tying together evidence on the external 
monitoring role by institutional investors, the benefits of investors’ geographic proximity, 
and the potential monitoring and disciplinary benefits of short-term debt, we hypothesize 
that firms monitored by local institutional investors will have shorter debt maturity.  
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Using dynamic panel system GMM estimators to account for unobservable 
heterogeneity, simultaneity, and the dynamic relation between debt maturity and 
institutional ownerships, we find support for the hypothesis. Analysis based on the 
maturity of new debt issues using SOX as a quasi-natural experiment also supports the 
hypothesis, as well as results based on firm headquarter relocations which can be viewed 
quasi-exogenous shocks to local institutional investor status, and results based on a 
matching analysis that holds location constant. We cannot rule out the possibility that local 
institutional investors seeks to minimize both debt agency costs and equity agency costs, 
but we find evidence suggesting that the effect of local institutional investors on debt 
maturity is strongest among firms expected to suffer from greater equity agency costs. The 
test using implementation of Reg FD as a natural experiment indicates that the relation 
between institutional proximity and debt maturity is not consistent with a pure information 
advantage based explanation. Overall results suggest that local institutional investors play 
an active monitoring role and effectively monitor management by exerting influence on 
corporate debt maturity policies. 
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3. THE EFFECT OF ALGORITHMIC TRADIGN ON FIRM VALUE 
 
Motivated by recent evidence that algorithmic trading impacts market quality, we 
examine the effect of algorithmic trading on firm value. Using an algorithmic trading 
proxy based on electronic message traffic, we find a positive relation between algorithmic 
trading and firm value. The relation is stronger for firms with lower stock liquidity, higher 
idiosyncratic volatility, higher analyst coverage, and greater information asymmetry, 
which suggest that the value increases occur through market quality channels. The results 
are robust to various model specifications, and reverse causality and endogeneity 
concerns. The results imply net benefits of algorithmic trading to firms.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
As commonly used, algorithmic trading refers to the use of computer algorithms to 
make trading decisions, submit orders, and manage orders after submission. Beginning in 
the U.S. equity market in the late 1990s, the use of algorithmic trading has become more 
common and predominant in major financial markets, representing an estimated 78% of 
all U.S. equity trading volume in 2012.20 Given the significant role of algorithmic trading 
in the stock market, investors, academics, and policymakers need a deeper understanding 
of its benefits and costs. Some extant studies conclude that algorithmic trading benefits 
                                               
20 See http://neverlosstrading.com/Algorithmic%20Trading.html.  We note that in 2009, the figure was 73% 
(see “Times Topics: High-Frequency Trading”, The New York Times, December 20, 2012), so there is an 
increase even from recent years. 
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capital markets by increasing trading volume and liquidity, reducing trading costs, and 
contributing to price discovery, while others conclude it increases volatility and harms 
capital markets. Moreover, algorithmic trading, especially the subset of it known as high 
frequency trading, has been criticized for contributing to the 2010 Flash Crash21 (e.g., 
Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2011)). Collectively, the literature provides mixed 
results on the question of whether algorithmic trading is a beneficial financial innovation, 
leaving it the subject of intense public debate and controversy.  
We contribute evidence to the debate by examining the impact of algorithmic trading 
on firm value. If algorithmic trading benefits the market quality of a firm’s stock by 
increasing liquidity and improving price efficiency, it should reduce information 
asymmetry and cost of capital, leading to higher firm value. Improved price efficiency 
could also increase the effectiveness of managerial compensation contracts that are based 
on stock prices and improve managerial investment decisions. In contrast, if algorithmic 
trading increases idiosyncratic volatility or reduces liquidity, it may increase equity risk 
and cost of capital, resulting in lower firm value. Existing literature suggests that 
algorithmic trading may have different effects on different aspects of market quality, such 
as liquidity, volatility, and price efficiency or informativeness, and its short-term and long-
term impacts may also differ.22 These potentially contradicting complexities make it 
                                               
21 On May 6, 2010, the Dow Jones Industrial Average plunged about 1000 points, the second largest intraday 
point swing ever to that date. This brief period of extreme intraday volatility is commonly referred to as the 
“Flash Crash”. 
22 See for example, Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2012), Hendershott and Riordan (2013), Brogaard, 
Hendershott, and Riordan (2013), Brogaard (2011), and Zhang (2010). 
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difficult to assess the overall impact of algorithmic trading on market quality, and the costs 
and benefits of algorithmic trading. By examining the effect of algorithmic trading on firm 
value, we hope to augment extant studies on the effects of algorithmic trading, and provide 
evidence useful for evaluating the net overall costs and benefits of algorithmic trading. 
To examine the relation between algorithmic trading intensity and firm value, we 
follow Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011), and Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2012) to 
construct an algorithmic trading proxy based on message traffic using the Trades and 
Quotes (TAQ) database. We find that algorithmic trading activity is significantly 
positively related to firm value after controlling for other variables that affect firm value. 
The relation is robust to the inclusion of year, industry, and firm-fixed effects, different 
model specifications, the use of two-stage least squares approach to address endogeneity 
concerns, and the use of an alternative proxy for algorithmic trading activity. 
To help establish a causal effect of algorithmic trading on firm value, we use the 
change to automated quote dissemination by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 
2003 as an exogenous shock to algorithmic trading intensity. Automated quotation 
provides quicker feedback to algorithms and results in more electronic message traffic. 
We use the change in electronic message traffic from before to after the automated quote 
dissemination as an instrument for the change in algorithmic trading intensity. Stocks with 
a larger increase in algorithmic trading intensity following the change to automated quote 
dissemination exhibit a larger increase in firm value, consistent with a causal effect of 
algorithmic trading on firm value. 
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Having documented a positive effect of algorithmic trading on firm value, we then 
attempt to identify the channels through which the value effects occur. If algorithmic 
trading enhances firm value by increasing liquidity or reducing idiosyncratic volatility, we 
would expect that the algorithmic trading effect is stronger for firms whose stocks are less 
liquid or have more volatile returns. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the effect 
of algorithmic trading on firm value is stronger for firms with less liquid stocks; 
additionally, the effect is stronger for firms with higher idiosyncratic volatility. If 
algorithmic trading increases firm value through efficiently contributing to price discovery 
and improving stock price informativeness, we would expect that the effect of algorithmic 
trading on firm value is stronger for firms with more publicly available information such 
as firms followed by more analysts, and stronger for firms with greater information 
asymmetry. Consistent with this expectation, we find that the effect of algorithmic trading 
on firm value is stronger for firms with higher analyst coverage and for firms with greater 
information asymmetry as measured by PIN (probability of informed trade). In sum, our 
results suggest that algorithmic trading increases firm value by improving stock liquidity, 
reducing idiosyncratic volatility, contributing to price discovery, and reducing information 
asymmetry. Combined with the evidence of beneficial effects of algorithmic trading on 
market quality, our results suggest significant benefits of algorithmic trading.  
Our study is not designed to rule out the existence of any harmful effects of 
algorithmic trading, so we cannot and do not conclude that it has no harmful effects. It is 
conceivable that algorithmic trading leads to negative effects such as flash crashes that 
manifest themselves periodically while still providing net benefits to firm value for stocks 
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with greater algorithmic trading. On the narrow firm value dimension, however, we can 
conclude that algorithmic trading is associated with increased firm value, especially for 
firms with illiquid and volatile stocks, and firms with greater information asymmetries.  
Our study contributes to the limited, but fast growing, literature on algorithmic 
trading and high frequency trading in a unique way by directly testing the relation between 
algorithmic trading activity and firm value. Prior studies on algorithmic trading and high 
frequency trading focus on their impacts on measures of market quality. Our results on 
firm value, to our knowledge the first such evidence, are critical in assessing the net social 
benefits of algorithmic trading.  
Our study also contributes to the strand of literature at the intersection of market 
microstructure and corporate finance, especially on the relation between financial markets 
and firm fundamentals. Financial markets not only reflect firm fundamentals, but they can 
also affect firm fundamentals. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003), Luo (2005), and Chen, 
Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) provide evidence that market prices affect firms’ investments 
via managerial learning and/or the firm’s access to new capital. Roll, Schwartz, and 
Subrahmanyam (2009) study the effect of options trading on firm value and show that 
corporate investment in firms with greater options trading is more sensitive to stock prices. 
Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) find that stock market liquidity positively impacts firm value 
through increasing the information content of market prices and of performance-sensitive 
managerial compensation. Our study contributes to this line of literature by showing that 
algorithmic trading affects firm value through improving market quality, including 
liquidity, volatility, and price discovery.  
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The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the sample, data sources and variable 
measurements. Section 3.4 presents the main empirical results, and Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2. Literature and Hypotheses  
Given the rapid increase in algorithmic trading activity in recent years, a central 
question that interests financial market participants, policymakers, and academics is 
whether algorithmic trading should be encouraged or discouraged. The algorithmic trading 
literature has focused on the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality and provides 
mixed evidence. On one hand, several studies suggest that algorithmic trading or high 
frequency trading creates excess volatility and may be detrimental to financial markets. 
For example, Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun (2011) study how high frequency 
trading is related to the May 6, 2010 Flash Crash and conclude that although high 
frequency trading did not cause the crash, it worsened the crash by exacerbating market 
volatility. Zhang (2010) finds that high frequency trading is positively correlated with 
stock price volatility, and negatively related to the market’s ability to incorporate 
information about firm fundamentals into asset prices. Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2012) 
conduct an international study using message counts as a proxy for algorithmic trading, 
and show that algorithmic trading increases volatility. 
On the other hand, many studies suggest a beneficial role of algorithmic trading in 
financial markets. Using NYSE electronic message traffic as a proxy for algorithmic 
trading activity, Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) find that algorithmic trading 
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improves liquidity and enhances price informativeness. Boehmer, Fong, and Wu (2012) 
provide international evidence showing similar results. Using a sample of algorithmic 
trading on the Deutsche Bourse, Hendershott and Riordan (2013) show that algorithmic 
traders consume liquidity when it is cheap and provide liquidity when it is expensive, 
which reduces liquidity risk. Groth (2011) finds that algorithmic trading does not create 
excess volatility, and does not reduce liquidity during periods of high volatility. Brogaard 
(2011) finds that high frequency trading reduces intraday volatility in the short-term. 
Brogaard, Hendershott, and Riordan (2013) find that overall high frequency trading 
enhances price efficiency. Similar evidence has also been found for algorithmic trading in 
other financial markets. Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson, and Vega (2013) provide 
evidence that algorithmic trading in exchange markets contributes to a more efficient price 
discovery process, and has a positive impact on market liquidity without creating excess 
volatility.  
All else equal, greater liquidity, lower idiosyncratic volatility, and higher price 
informativeness should increase firm value. Thus, if algorithmic trading plays a beneficial 
role in financial markets by improving liquidity, reducing idiosyncratic volatility, and/or 
enhancing price informativeness, it should positively affect firm value. Both theoretical 
and empirical studies have shown that liquidity should be priced by the market. Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986) model effects of bid-ask speared on asset returns and predict that 
expected return is positively related to illiquidity. O’Hara (2003) argues that asset pricing 
models should incorporate transaction costs of liquidity. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) 
derive a liquidity-based capital asset pricing model, and show that an increase in liquidity 
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results in higher contemporaneous returns and lower expected future returns. Thus, greater 
liquidity leads to higher current stock prices and greater firm value. Another line of 
literature relates liquidity to firm performance. Liquid markets permits non-blockholders 
to intervene and become blockholders, which then improves monitoring and corporate 
governance (Maug (1998)). Liquidity can also have a disciplinary effect on management 
by facilitating informed selling or “dumping” (“Wall Street Walk”) (e.g., Edmans (2009); 
Admati and Pfleiderer (2009)). Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) and Khanna and Sonti 
(2004) show that liquidity can positively affect firm performance by stimulating the entry 
of informed investors who make price more informative to stakeholders. Fang, Noe, and 
Tice (2009) show that stock market liquidity positively impacts firm value through 
increasing the information content of market prices and of performance-sensitive 
managerial compensation contracts.  
 Moreover, Merton (1987) predicts that idiosyncratic risk is positively related to the 
expected stock returns when market is information-segmented and investors are under-
diversified. Fu (2009) empirically confirms the positive relation between idiosyncratic 
volatility and expected return. Lower idiosyncratic volatility would lead to lower risk and 
lower expected return or cost of capital, resulting in higher contemporaneous stock prices 
and firm value. In addition, more informative stock prices should help managers make 
better investment decisions and reduce the cost of capital by reducing information 
asymmetry (Diamond and Verrecchia (1991)) and by enabling firms to design more 
efficient managerial compensation contracts (Holmstrom and Tirole (1993)).  
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Thus, given that greater liquidity, lower idiosyncratic volatility, and higher price 
informativeness all lead to greater firm value, if algorithmic trading improves liquidity, 
reduces idiosyncratic volatility, and enhances price information efficiency, it should 
positively affect firm value. This leads to our main hypothesis: 
H1: All else equal, firms whose stocks are more heavily traded using computer 
algorithms have higher value. 
We next generate several hypotheses about the channels through which algorithmic 
trading might affect firm value. Hendershott and Riordan (2013) find that algorithmic 
trading supplies more liquidity when spreads are wide, suggesting a stronger positive 
effect of algorithmic trading on liquidity for less liquid stocks. As discussed above, both 
theoretical and empirical studies show that higher liquidity leads to higher firm value. 
Therefore, if algorithmic trading enhances firm value through increasing liquidity, its 
effect on firm value is expected to be stronger for firms with less liquid stocks. This leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
H2a: All else equal, the effect of algorithmic trading on firm value is stronger when 
stock liquidity is lower. 
Similarly, since lower idiosyncratic volatility is related to higher firm value, if 
algorithmic trading enhances firm value through reducing idiosyncratic volatility, its 
effect on firm value should be stronger for firms with higher idiosyncratic stock return 
volatility. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H2b: All else equal, the effect of algorithmic trading on firm value is stronger when 
idiosyncratic volatility is higher. 
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If algorithmic trading enhances firm value through contributing to price discovery, 
its effect should be stronger when algorithmic trading is more informative. Because 
algorithmic trading relies on computer algorithms to make trade decisions without human 
intervention, it does not rely on additional information that is not publicly available to 
contribute to price discovery. Instead, the advantage of algorithmic trading over human 
trading is the ability of computer algorithms to simultaneously process volumes of public 
information received electronically and make trading decisions at high speeds that 
ordinary human traders cannot match. In other words, algorithmic trading contributes to 
price discovery by efficiently incorporating already existing information into stock prices, 
not by producing new information. Thus, algorithmic trading should contribute relatively 
more to price efficiency if there is more public information available. If algorithmic 
trading increases firm value by improving price efficiency, the effect of algorithmic 
trading on firm value should be stronger for firms with more public information. We use 
the extent of analyst coverage as a measure of public information, which then leads to the 
next hypothesis: 
H2c: All else equal, the effect of algorithmic trading on firm value is stronger for 
firms with higher analyst coverage. 
Finally, if algorithmic trading enhances firm value by increasing price 
informativeness and reducing information asymmetry, its effect should be stronger for 
firms with greater information asymmetry. This leads to our last hypothesis: 
H2d: All else equal, the effect of algorithmic trading on firm value is stronger for 
firms with greater information asymmetry.  
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3.3. Data 
3.3.1. Sample Selection 
We start with a sample of all stocks covered in the TAQ database from 2002 to 2006. 
We limit our attention to the post-decimalization period because decimalization in 2001 
was a major structural change to the stock trading system, and we end our sample period 
in 2006 to avoid potential abnormal trading activities during the financial crisis of 2007-
2008. TAQ contains intraday transaction (quotes and trades) data for all securities listed 
on NYSE, American Stock Exchange (AMEX), Nasdaq, and SmallCap issues. We obtain 
firm financial data from the Compustat database, stock return and total trading volume 
data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and analyst coverage data 
from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. We include only 
common stocks (those with a share code of 10 or 11 in the CRSP database).  We also 
require each firm-fiscal year observation to have a non-missing value of Tobin’s q, the 
measure of firm value, which we define below. Our final sample has 22,577 firm-fiscal 
year observations with 5,834 unique firms. 
3.3.2. Variable Construction 
3.3.2.1. Algorithmic Trading 
Following Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) and Boehmer, Fong, and Wu 
(2012), we construct a proxy measure for algorithmic trading based on electronic message 
traffic. Hendershott et al. (2011) have access to order-level messages and their algorithmic 
trading proxy is the number of messages normalized by dollar volume. Specifically, they 
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define the algorithmic trading proxy as the negative of dollar volume divided by the 
number of messages, including order submissions, order cancellations and trades. They 
also use the number of messages normalized by number of trades or the raw message as 
proxies and find the same results. Boehmer et al. (2012) construct a similar proxy. Because 
they do not have access to order-level messages, and only observe each exchange’s best 
quotes and trades, they define a message as either a trade or an update in the best bids and 
offers (BBO) and measure algorithmic trading as the negative of dollar volume associated 
with each message.23  
The TAQ database that we use in this study contains transaction-level messages, but 
no order-level messages. Thus, we follow Boehmer et al. (2012) to define a message as 
either a trade or a change in BBO, and construct our algorithmic trading proxy measure as 
the normalized number of messages. To avoid a mechanical correlation between our 
algorithmic trading proxy and Tobin’s q, we use number of trades instead of dollar volume 
to normalize the number of messages. Specifically, for firm i’s stock, its BBO is 
determined following Hasbrouck (2010),24 and the number of trades and number of 
changes in BBO are aggregated over firm i’s fiscal year. Our algorithmic trading proxy, 
Algo Trade, is defined as the negative of number of trades divided by the number of 
                                               
23 Boehmer et al. (2012) point out that they can qualitatively replicate Hendershott et al. (2011) results using 
the U.S. portion of their sample and their algorithmic trading proxy constructed from the TAQ data. 
 
24 Following Hasbrouck (2010), we use all quotes available at a given time to determine the BBO, and do 
not drop quotes. If there are multiple quotes occurring in the same second, BBO is determined based on the 
order of quote records, and there can be updates in BBO in the same second. 
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messages that includes changes in BBO and trades. Greater Algo Trade indicates more 
messages per trade and higher algorithmic trading intensity. 
 Moreover, the TAQ database allows us to observe all quotes, not just BBO. 
Therefore, as a robustness check for Algo Trade, we construct an alternative algorithmic 
trading proxy, Algo Trade_q, by considering updates of all quotes, rather than only the 
best quotes, as messages. We define Algo Trade_q, as the negative of number of trades 
divided by the number of messages that includes updates in quotes and trades.25 These two 
measures have a correlation of 0.55, which suggests that they have a strong common 
component, yet have some independent variation.  
3.3.2.2. Other Variables 
We use Tobin’s q to measure firm value. Following Roll, Schwartz, and 
Subrahmanyam (2009), Tobin’s q is computed as the ratio of the market value of assets to 
the book value of assets of the firm, where the market value of assets is calculated as the 
sum of the market value of common stock, the liquidation value of preferred shares, and 
the book value of long-term debt.  
We include a wide range of control variables in our analysis. We control for stock 
return, lagged stock return, and turnover to capture factors from the stock market that may 
affect firm value. Stock return and lagged stock return are the accumulated daily return 
over a firm’s current and prior fiscal years, respectively. Turnover is the total trading 
                                               
25 There are some stocks that are thinly traded but have relatively large numbers of quote updates, and 
therefore, have high values of Algo Trade or AlgoTrade_q. Excluding those stocks by adding a minimum 
trade filter (e.g., 1,000 or 3,000 trades per year) for stocks to enter the sample does not change the results 
qualitatively. 
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volume over a firm’s fiscal year divided by the number of shares outstanding at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. In alternative specifications, turnover is replaced by total 
trading volume or dollar volume. 
Following Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009) and Fang, Noe, and Tice 
(2009), we also control for several firm characteristics that are related to firm valuation. 
Return on assets (ROA) is net income divided by the book value of assets. Capex is capital 
expenditures divided by book value of assets. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of 
total book assets. Leverage is total debt divided by book value of assets. Analyst is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following a firm during the fiscal 
year. Dividend is an indicator variable for whether the firm pays a dividend during the 
fiscal year. SP500 is an indicator variable for whether the firm is included in the S&P 500 
during the fiscal year. Industries are defined based on the Fama and French 48 industry 
classifications. As mentioned above, we also control for Return and Returnt-1, which are 
stock returns over the fiscal years t and t-1, respectively. 
3.3.3. Summary Statistics  
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for Tobin’s q, Algo Trade, and the control 
variables. In our sample, the mean value of Tobin’s q is 1.518, with a standard deviation 
of 1.492 and median of 1.077.  For the average stock over our sample period, the average 
annual turnover is 1.686, with annual trading volume of 131.4 million shares and dollar 
volume of $3.459 billion. The mean value of Algo Trade is -0.441, which means that for 
the average stock, there are 0.441 trades per electronic message, or equivalently, 2.12 
messages per trade.  
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics for Section 3 
The table reports summary statistics for the sample of stock-fiscal year observations. Tobin’s q is the market 
value of common stock plus liquidation value of preferred shares plus book value of long-term debt divided 
by the book value of assets. Algo Trade is the proxy for algorithmic trading, defined over firm i’s fiscal year 
as the negative of number of trades divided by the number of message that includes the number of changes 
in best bid-offer (BBO) and the number of trades. Turnover is the trading volume of firm i’s stock over the 
fiscal year divided by the number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the fiscal year. Volume is the 
trading volume of firm i’s stock over the fiscal year (multiplied by 10-8). Dollar Volume is the dollar trading 
volume of firm i’s stock over the fiscal year (multiplied by 10-9). ROA is return on assets measured as net 
income divided by book value of assets. Capex is capital expenditures divided by book value of assets. Firm 
size is measured by Log(Total Assets). Leverage is measured as total debt divided by book value of assets. 
Analyst is analyst coverage measured by the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following 
firm i during fiscal year t. Stock Return is stock return over the fiscal year. Dividend is a dummy variable 
for whether the firm pays a dividend during the fiscal year. SP500 is a dummy variable for whether the firm 
is included in the S&P 500 during the fiscal year. The sample period is from 2002 through 2006. Only 
common stocks (those with a share code of 10 or 11 in the CRSP database) are included in the sample. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 5th Pctl 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 95th Pctl 
(1) Tobin’s  q 1.518 1.492 0.206 0.612 1.077 1.851 4.459 
(2) Algo Trade -0.441 0.236 -0.839 -0.596 -0.464 -0.273 -0.029 
(3) Turnover 1.686 1.862 0.128 0.452 1.086 2.178 5.437 
(4) Volume 1.314 3.056 0.005 0.044 0.279 1.066 6.145 
(5) Dollar Volume 3.459 9.381 0.003 0.031 0.289 2.006 18.223 
(6) ROA 0.036 0.219 -0.379 0.018 0.077 0.143 0.255 
(7) Capex 0.041 0.051 0.001 0.010 0.025 0.052 0.143 
(8) Firm Size 5.968 2.095 2.595 4.473 5.947 7.326 9.665 
(9) Leverage 0.197 0.205 0 0.018 0.147 0.302 0.601 
(10) Analyst 1.465 1.103 0 0 1.609 2.398 3.178 
(11) Stock Return 0.205 0.664 -0.611 -0.150 0.104 0.388 1.374 
(12) Dividend 0.367 0.482 0 0 0 1 1 
(13) SP500 0.107 0.309 0 0 0 0 1 
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3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Baseline Results 
This section examines the effect of algorithmic trading on firm value measured by 
Tobin’ q. The baseline specification is: 
Tobin’s q = a + b×Algo Trade + c×Turnover (alternately, Volume or Dollar Volume)  
                        + d×ROA + e×Capex + f×Size + g×Leverage + h×Analyst + j×Return  
                        + k×Returnt-1 + l×Dividend + m×SP500 + error term                                     (3.1) 
where Algo Trade is the proxy for algorithmic trading intensity, Turnover, Volume (total 
trading volume), or Dollar Volume (total dollar volume) are controlled in separate 
specifications, respectively, and the control variables are as defined in the previous 
section.  
We start the analysis by estimating Equation (3.1) as a panel regression with firm 
fixed effects. Although Equation (3.1) controls for a series of variables related to stock 
market and firm characteristics, it is possible that some unobservable firm characteristics 
may affect algorithmic trading activity and also correlate with firm value, and such omitted 
variables can bias estimation results of a simple ordinary least square regression. We use 
firm fixed effects to control for the unobservable firm characteristics that are constant over 
time. We also control for year and industry fixed effects to capture factors such as 
macroeconomic conditions and industry specific factors that may affect all firms. All 
standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.  
The panel regression results are shown in Table 3.2. Models in Panel A controls for 
firm fixed effects only.  For the three specifications that control for turnover, total trading  
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Table 3.2. Firm Fixed Effects Panel Regressions 
The table reports estimates of panel regressions controlling for firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is 
Tobin’s q. The independent variables include algorithmic trading proxy (Algo Trade), Turnover (model (1)), 
Volume (model (2)), Dollar Volume (model (3)), ROA, Capex, Firm Size, Leverage, Analyst, Stock Return, 
Lagged Stock Return (Lagged Return), Dividend, SP500, year dummies (Panel B), industry dummies (Panel 
B), and firm dummies. The industry classifications are defined by Fama and French (1997). Coefficients on 
year, industry, and firm dummies are not reported. T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for both 
heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered by firm. The sample period is from 2002 through 2006. 
Only common stocks (those with a share code of 10 or 11 in the CRSP database) are included in the sample. 
See Table 3.1 for variable definitions. 
 Panel A  Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Algo Trade 0.287 0.253 0.200  0.281 0.248 0.196 
 (6.17) (5.46) (4.30)  (5.98) (5.33) (4.18) 
Turnover 0.073    0.062   
 (9.25)    (7.97)   
Volume  0.060    0.050  
  (7.37)    (6.44)  
Dollar Volume   0.028    0.024 
   (12.27)    (10.59) 
ROA -0.388 -0.373 -0.369  -0.288 -0.272 -0.272 
 (-2.51) (-2.40) (-2.38)  (-1.92) (-1.81) (-1.81) 
Capex 1.667 1.766 1.627  1.567 1.651 1.555 
 (5.88) (6.19) (5.71)  (5.57) (5.84) (5.51) 
Firm Size -0.415 -0.403 -0.437  -0.579 -0.573 -0.594 
 (-12.35) (-11.94) (-12.91)  (-16.01) (-15.75) (-16.36) 
Leverage -0.124 -0.125 -0.078  0.003 0.005 0.041 
 (-1.07) (-1.07) (-0.67)  (0.03) (0.05) (0.37) 
Analyst 0.362 0.389 0.395  0.372 0.395 0.401 
 (13.45) (14.30) (14.58)  (14.26) (15.07) (15.31) 
Stock Return 0.618 0.640 0.639  0.625 0.643 0.640 
 (37.88) (38.91) (38.93)  (36.41) (37.22) (37.12) 
Lagged Return 0.255 0.275 0.269  0.255 0.271 0.264 
 (23.26) (25.10) (24.81)  (22.38) (23.81) (23.52) 
Dividend 0.246 0.246 0.229  0.154 0.153 0.141 
 (6.99) (7.03) (6.51)  (4.42) (4.37) (4.03) 
SP500 0.214 0.105 -0.010  0.187 0.095 -0.003 
 (2.88) (1.45) (-0.14)  (2.51) (1.29) (-0.04) 
Year Dummy No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,123 20,123 20,123  20,123 20,123 20,123 
Adjusted R2 0.353 0.348 0.356  0.377 0.373 0.379 
 77 
 
volume, and total dollar trading volume, respectively, the coefficients on Algo Trade are 
all positive and significant at the 1% level, implying that firms whose stocks have higher 
algorithmic trading activities have greater firm value. The effect of algorithmic trading on 
firm value is also economically significant. For example, based on the standard deviation 
of Algo Trade and the sample mean of Tobin’s q, the coefficient on Algo Trade in model 
(1) implies that a one standard deviation increase in Algo Trade results in an increase in 
Tobin’s q by 0.068, which is about 4.5% of its sample mean. The significantly positive 
effect of Algo Trade on Tobins’ q remains largely unchanged when year and industry fixed 
effects are included, as shown in Panel B. 
Most of the control variables are significantly related to Tobin’s q. As expected, the 
coefficients on turnover (in model (1)), volume (in model (2)), or dollar volume (in model 
(3)) are significantly positive, and stock return and lagged stock return are positively 
related to firm value. Firm size has a significantly negative coefficient, implying that on 
average smaller firms have higher Tobin's q, which is consistent with the findings in Fang, 
Noe, and Tice (2009).26 Capital expenditure is positively related to firm value, indicating 
that firms with more future growth opportunities are more highly valued. Leverage has an 
insignificant effect, and contrary to expectation, return on asset has a significantly negative 
effect. Analyst coverage has a significantly positive coefficient suggesting that analyst 
coverage may create attention and lead to higher firm valuation.  
                                               
26 In this paper and in Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009), firm size is measured by book value of assets, which is 
negatively related to Tobin’s q. Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009) measure firm size by market 
capitalization, which is positively related to Tobin’s q, and find a positive relation between Tobin’s q and 
firm size. 
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Both the dividend dummy and the SP500 dummy have significantly positive 
coefficients. Dividend-paying firms may have higher valuation than non-dividend paying 
firms because they are less financially constrained (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 
(1988)) and have lower agency costs of free cash flow or overinvestment (Rozeff (1982); 
Easterbrook (1984); Jensen (1986)). S&P 500 firms may have higher value than non-S&P 
500 firms because they have greater liquidity.   
In summary, the results in this section indicate that algorithmic trading activity has 
a significantly positive impact on firm valuation after controlling for other variables 
related to firm value, as well as firm, industry and year fixed effects. The results are 
consistent with hypothesis H1.  
3.4.2. Reverse Causality and Endogeneity  
In this section we perform several analyses to address concerns about reverse 
causality and endogeneity.  
3.4.2.1. Reverse Causality 
The results shown in the previous sections reveal a strong positive relation between 
algorithmic trading activity and firm value. We next attempt to establish whether the effect 
is causal from algorithmic trading to firm value. It is possible that the causality runs in the 
opposite direction. The positive relation between algorithmic trading and firm value may 
occur if higher firm value attracts more algorithmic trading activity.  
We address the reverse causality question using an exogenous shock to algorithmic 
trading activity, which is the NYSE automated quote dissemination in early 2003. 
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Autoquote was an important innovation for algorithmic traders. Specialists used to 
manually disseminate the inside quote, whereas with autoquote a new automated quote is 
generated immediately whenever there is a change to the NYSE limit order book. An 
automated quote update could provide more immediate feedback about the potential terms 
of trade and more critical new information to algorithms. Thus, this exogenous shock in 
market structure increases the amount of algorithmic trading and results in more electronic 
message traffic.27,28 Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) show that autoquote is 
positively correlated with their electronic message based algorithmic trading measure, and 
they use autoquote as an instrument for algorithimic trading.   
We use the change in the normalized electronic message, Algo Trade, from before 
to after the NYSE autoquote dissemination as an instrument for algorithmic trading. We 
can establish a causal effect of algorithmic trading on firm value by showing that stocks 
with a larger increase in algorithmic trading activity following the autoquote 
dissemination have a larger increase in firm value. Since the automated quote was 
introduced between January and May of 2003, the change in algorithmic trading activity 
before and after this exogenous shock is measured as the difference in Algo Trade between 
2002 and 2004.29 Changes in Tobin’s q and the control variables are calculated over the 
same time period. Taking the change over two years also allows Tobin’s q to respond to 
                                               
27 See Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) for more discussion about the NYSE automated quote 
dissemination. 
28 The mean values of Algo Trade are -0.470 and -0.402 in 2002 and 2004, respectively, corresponding to 
2.12 and 2.49 messages per trade in 2002 and 2004, respectively. 
29 For this test we only include firms with fiscal year ending month being May or later to make sure that 
Algo Trade in year 2004 is measured starting from June 2003, which is after the NYSE had completed 
automated quote for all stocks.  
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changes in algorithmic trading activity. Our approach is the same as that in Fang, Noe, 
and Tice (2009), who use decimalization in 2001, another change in market structure, as 
the exogenous shock to liquidity to establish causality from liquidity to firm value. 
Similarly, they take changes around the decimalization as from 2000 to 2002.   
To test the causality from algorithmic trading to firm value, the change in Tobin’s q 
is regressed on the change in Algo Trade and the changes in the control variables. The 
specification is: 
ΔTobin’s q = a + b×ΔAlgo Trade + c×ΔTurnover (alternately, ΔVolume or ΔDollar 
                     Volume) + d×ΔROA  + e×ΔCapex + f×ΔSize + g×ΔLeverage  
                     + h×ΔAnalyst + j×ΔReturn + k×ΔReturnt-1 +  l×ΔDividend + m×ΔSP500 
                     + error term                                                                               (3.2) 
where Δ represents the change from 2002 to 2004. Equation (3.2) is estimated using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) procedures with industry fixed effects. As shown in Table 
3.3, the coefficient on ΔAlgo Trade is positive and significant, indicating that an increase 
in algorithmic trading activity following the automated quote dissemination results in an 
increase in firm value. We conclude that the results are consistent with algorithmic trading 
activity having a causal effect on firm value. 
3.4.2.2. Two-stage Least Squares Regressions 
In the earlier section, we establish our baseline results using panel regressions and 
include firm fixed effects to control for omitted unobservables that are constant over time. 
If the omitted variables vary over time, firm fixed effects would not be sufficient to control 
for endogeneity. Thus, in this section, we use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression  
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Table 3.3. Reverse Causality Test: NYSE Stocks  
The table reports estimates of regressions using changes in variables from 2002 to 2004. The dependent 
variable is ΔTobin’s q. The independent variables include ΔAlgo Trade, ΔTurnover (model (1)), ΔVolume 
(model (2)), ΔDollar Volume (model (3)), ΔROA, ΔCapex, ΔFirm Size, ΔLeverage, ΔAnalyst, ΔStock 
Return, ΔLagged Return, ΔDividend, ΔSP500, and industry dummies. Δ represents change from 2002 to 
2004. The industry classifications are defined by Fama and French (1997). Coefficients on industry dummies 
are not reported. T-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Only 
common stocks (those with a share code of 10 or 11 in the CRSP database) listed on NYSE are included in 
the sample. See Table 3.1 for variable definitions. 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆Algo Trade 0.233 0.235 0.219 
 (2.20) (2.32) (2.24) 
∆Turnover 0.001   
 (0.02)   
∆Volume  0.004  
  (0.29)  
∆Dollar Volume   0.010 
   (1.90) 
∆ROA 1.682 1.675 1.577 
 (3.19) (3.25) (3.10) 
∆Capex 1.533 1.530 1.497 
 (3.31) (3.28) (3.22) 
∆Firm Size -0.294 -0.297 -0.329 
 (-4.96) (-5.12) (-5.51) 
∆Leverage 0.131 0.133 0.173 
 (0.85) (0.86) (1.10) 
∆Analyst 0.126 0.126 0.127 
 (4.22) (4.19) (4.23) 
∆Stock Return 0.261 0.262 0.265 
 (6.16) (5.85) (6.07) 
∆Lagged Return 0.139 0.139 0.132 
 (6.84) (6.73) (6.84) 
∆Dividend 0.139 0.139 0.132 
 (2.59) (2.59) (2.49) 
∆SP500 -0.114 -0.113 -0.136 
 (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.74) 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,197 1,197 1,197 
Adjusted R2 0.332 0.332 0.339 
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Table 3.4. Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) Regressions with Firm Fixed Effects 
The table reports the second stage regression results of 2SLS regressions with firm fixed effects. In the first-
stage regressions, Algo Trade is regressed on its first lag, an instrumental variable, IV_Algo Trade, and 
other control variables that are included in the baseline specification (Equation (3.1)). In the second-stage 
regressions, Tobin’s q is regressed on the predicted value of Algo Trade, Pred_Algo Trade, and all control 
variables. Models (1), (2) and (3) control for Turnover, Volume, and Dollar Volume, respectively. Year, 
industry, and firm dummies are included but their coefficients are not reported. For firm i, IV_Algo Trade 
is the average value of Algo Trade of two firms in the same industry as firm i with the closest stock return 
volatility. If firm i is the most (lest) volatile firm in its industry, the second most (lest) volatile firm in its 
industry is selected to compute IV_Algo Trade. The industry classifications are defined by Fama and French 
(1997). See Table I for definitions of other variables. T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for both 
heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered by firm. p-values of Hansen’ J-tests are reported. The 
sample period is from 2002 through 2006. Only common stocks (those with a share code of 10 or 11 in the 
CRSP database) are included in the sample. 
 (1) (2)  (3)  
Pred_Algo Trade 1.688 2.073 1.969 
 (6.21) (6.78) (6.62) 
Turnover 0.086   
 (8.43)   
Volume  0.077  
  (7.91)  
Dollar Volume   0.024 
   (10.31) 
ROA -0.216 -0.194 -0.201 
 (-1.37) (-1.22) (-1.27) 
Capex 1.838 1.932 1.864 
 (5.53) (5.72) (5.54) 
Firm Size -0.715 -0.708 -0.713 
 (-16.47) (-16.05) (-16.11) 
Leverage 0.034 0.045 0.075 
 (0.26) (0.34) (0.57) 
Analyst 0.365 0.408 0.415 
 (12.91) (13.70) (13.96) 
Stock Return 0.628 0.658 0.655 
 (35.28) (36.02) (35.70) 
Lagged Return 0.263 0.287 0.281 
 (20.18) (22.09) (21.86) 
Dividend 0.138 0.142 0.130 
 (3.80) (3.81) (3.50) 
SP500 0.187 0.079 0.013 
 (2.61) (1.17) (0.20) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15,292 15,292 15,292 
Adjusted R2 0.329 0.286 0.297 
p-value of Hansen’ J-Test 0.254 0.126 0.184 
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approach to attempt to further address endogeneity concerns. In this approach the 
unobservables do not have to be constant over time. We use the lag of Algo Trade and the 
average Algo Trade of two industry comparable firms with the closest stock return 
volatilities as the instruments. These instrumental variables are believed to be exogenous, 
i.e., they are correlated with current algorithmic trading activity but should not affect 
current firm value. In the first-stage regressions, Algo Trade is regressed on the 
instruments as well as all control variables in the baseline specifications. The second-stage 
regressions are the same as the baseline specifications shown in Table 3.2 except for Algo 
Trade being replaced by the predicted value from the first-stage regressions. Regressions 
in both stages control for year, industry and firm fixed effects. 
In the first-stage regressions (results not tabulated), the coefficients on all 
instruments are significantly positive, indicating that the instruments are correlated with 
Algo Trade. Hansen’s J-test statistics shown in Table 3.4 are insignificant with large p-
values, suggesting that the instruments are uncorrelated with the errors of the second-stage 
equation. Therefore, the instruments are significantly correlated with Algo Trade, but they 
are uncorrelated with Tobin’s q, which implies that they are valid. In the second-stage 
regressions as shown in Table 3.4, consistent with the results from the baseline 
specifications, coefficients on the predicted values of Algo Trade are positive and 
significant at 1% level, confirming a significantly positive effect of algorithmic trading on 
firm value. 
In summary, the results of a positive impact of algorithmic trading activity on firm 
value shown in the baseline specifications are robust to concerns about reverse causality 
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and the use of the two-stage least squares approach. The results are consistent with 
algorithmic trading activity having a causal effect on firm value. 
3.4.3. Liquidity, Idiosyncratic Volatility, and Information 
In this section, we present additional tests to explore channels through which 
algorithmic trading affects firm value. Our hypotheses are that algorithmic trading 
enhances firm value through improving capital market quality, such as increasing 
liquidity, reducing idiosyncratic volatility, contributing to price discovery and reducing 
information asymmetry. We do not directly test whether algorithmic trading affects market 
quality as that is established in prior studies. Instead, we test hypotheses that are implied 
by the channels, as developed in the Section 3.2. 
3.4.3.1. Liquidity Channel 
If algorithmic trading enhances firm value through increasing liquidity, its effect on 
firm value is expected to be stronger for firms with less liquid stocks, as stated in the 
hypothesis H2a. We employ two approaches to test this hypothesis. First, we include an 
interaction term in the firm fixed effects panel regression. The model specification is 
similar to Equation (3.1), with an additional term interacting Algo Trade with lagged 
Amihud illiquidity, Algo Trade*Amihudt-1, included at the right-hand side.30 Year and 
industry fixed effects are controlled. The results are shown in Panel A of Table 3.5. The 
coefficient on  Algo Trade remains significantly positive as before, and the coefficient on 
                                               
30 Stock liquidity is measured by Amihud illiquidity (Amihud, 2002), Amihud, defined as the annual average 
of daily ratio of the absolute stock return to its dollar volume over the fiscal year (multiplied by 103). 
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Table 3.5. Test Liquidity and Volatility Hypotheses Using Firm Fixed Effects Regression 
The table reports results of firm fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q. The 
independent variables are the same as in Equitation (3.1), with an additional interaction term between Algo 
Trade and lagged Amihud illiquidity (Algo Trade*Amihudt-1, Panel A) or lagged idiosyncratic volatility 
(Algo Trade*IVOLt-1, Panel B) included. Models (1), (2) and (3) control for Turnover, Volume, and Dollar 
Volume, respectively. Amihud illiquidity is the annual average of daily ratio of the absolute stock return to 
its dollar volume (multiplied by 103). Idiosyncratic volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the 
residuals from fitting the four-factor model (Fama-French (1993) three factors plus the momentum factor) 
to daily returns over the fiscal year. T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and 
within correlation clustered by firm. The sample period is from 2002 through 2006. Only common stocks 
are included in the sample. See Table 3.1 for variable definitions. 
 Panel A: Liquidity  Panel B: Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Algo Trade 0.303 0.265 0.208  0.086 0.070 0.032 
 (6.10) (5.38) (4.19)  (1.36) (1.13) (0.51) 
Algo Trade*Amihudt-1 0.249 0.271 0.284     
 (3.23) (3.37) (3.42)     
Algo Trade*IVOLt-1     5.103 4.576 4.127 
     (4.03) (3.69) (3.36) 
Turnover 0.064    0.067   
 (8.04)    (8.49)   
Volume  0.050    0.053  
  (6.48)    (6.77)  
Dollar Volume   0.024    0.025 
   (10.59)    (10.71) 
ROA -0.280 -0.262 -0.260  -0.302 -0.283 -0.281 
 (-1.84) (-1.71) (-1.71)  (-1.99) (-1.86) (-1.85) 
Capex 1.636 1.736 1.633  1.523 1.615 1.522 
 (5.65) (5.96) (5.62)  (5.43) (5.72) (5.40) 
Firm Size -0.588 -0.581 -0.603  -0.587 -0.580 -0.601 
 (-15.91) (-15.63) (-16.24)  (-16.09) (-15.81) (-16.39) 
Leverage -0.018 -0.014 0.023  -0.001 0.002 0.038 
 (-0.16) (-0.12) (0.21)  (-0.01) (0.02) (0.34) 
Analyst 0.377 0.400 0.406  0.364 0.390 0.396 
 (14.14) (14.94) (15.18)  (13.91) (14.78) (15.07) 
Return 0.637 0.657 0.653  0.632 0.651 0.646 
 (36.37) (37.11) (36.98)  (36.89) (37.75) (37.57) 
Lagged Return 0.254 0.271 0.263  0.257 0.274 0.267 
 (22.08) (23.53) (23.21)  (22.56) (24.06) (23.76) 
Dividend 0.144 0.143 0.130  0.152 0.150 0.138 
 (4.06) (4.03) (3.67)  (4.32) (4.27) (3.94) 
SP500 0.191 0.097 -0.001  0.192 0.094 -0.003 
 (2.55) (1.32) (-0.01)  (2.55) (1.27) (-0.03) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,464 19,464 19,464  19,975 19,975 19,975 
Adjusted R2 0.380 0.376 0.382  0.378 0.374 0.380 
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the interaction term is also positive and significant, suggesting that the positive effect of 
algorithmic trading on firm value is stronger for firms with less liquid stocks, consistent 
with the hypothesis H2a. 
Secondly, we apply a block diagonal regression approach to test the hypothesis H2a. 
Specifically, we sort stocks into quintile groups each year based on lagged Amihud 
illiquidity, and define new algorithmic trading activity measures, Algo Trade_n, for each 
illiquidity group. In general, Algo Trade_n equals to Algo Trade for stocks in lagged 
illiquidity quintile n and zero otherwise, where n=1, 2, 3, 4, 5. For example, Algo Trade_1 
equals to Algo Trade for stocks in lagged illiquidity quintile 1 (lowest Amihud illiquidity 
quintile) and zero otherwise, and Algo Trade_5 equals to Algo Trade for stocks in lagged 
illiquidity quintile 5 (highest Amihud illiquidity quintile) and zero otherwise. This 
approach allows the effect of algorithmic trading to vary across firms with different levels 
of liquidity in a nonlinear way. We estimate the following firm fixed effects panel 
regression: 
Tobin’s q = a + ∑n bn×Algo Trade_n + c× Turnover (alternately, Volume or Dollar  
                       Volume) + d×ROA + e×Capex + f×Size + g×Leverage + h×Analyst  
                       + j×Return  k×Returnt-1 + l×Dividend + m×SP500 + error term                 (3.3) 
 
where n =1, 2, 3, 4, 5. With this specification, bn captures the effect of Algo Trade on 
Tobin’s q for firms in the nth illiquidity quintile. Testing the differences among bn allows 
us to examine the (il)liquidity dependence of the algorithmic trading effect on firm value. 
Compared to the first approach that includes Algo Trade interacting with lagged Amihud 
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illiquidity, the advantage of the specification in Equation (3.3) is that it allows for the 
effect of algorithmic trading on firm value to vary in a nonlinear way based on (il)liquidity.  
Table 3.6 Panel A reports the estimation results of Equation (3.3) with year, industry, 
and firm fixed effects. Models (1), (2), and (3) control for turnover, volume, and dollar 
volume, respectively. For brevity, only estimates of bn, the coefficients on Algo Trade_n, 
are reported. In general the effect of Algo Trade on Tobin’s q is positive and significant, 
and increases with lagged illiquidity. When turnover is controlled, the coefficients on Algo 
Trade_n, bn, are significant across all illiquidity quintiles, and increase when moving from 
low quintiles to high quintiles, with b5 being significantly greater than b1. The difference 
between b5 and b1 is also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in 
Algo Trade for firms in the lowest illiquidity quintile (quintile 1) results in an increase in 
Tobin’s q by 0.034 (0.143×0.238), while a one standard deviation increase in Algo Trade 
for firms in the highest illiquidity quintile (quintile 5) leads to an increase in Tobin’s q by 
0.070 (0.41×0.170), which is twice as large as that for firms in the lowest quintile.31 The 
results are similar when volume or dollar volume is controlled, although b1 and b2 are not 
significant in model (3) when dollar volume is controlled. So, the effect of algorithmic 
trading on firm value is stronger for firms with less liquid stocks, consistent with the 
results from the first approach and supporting the hypothesis H2a.  
                                               
31 The standard deviation of Algo Trade for firms in the lowest (highest) lagged illiquidity quintile is 0.238 
(0.170). 
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The overall results of testing liquidity channel indicate that the effect of algorithmic 
trading on firm value is stronger when stocks are less liquid (or more illiquid), consistent 
with the notion that algorithmic trading enhances firm value through increasing liquidity.  
 
 
 
Table 3.6. Firm Fixed Effects Regressions with Effect of Algo Trade on Tobin’s q Varying 
Across Lagged Amihud Illiquidity or Lagged IVOL Quintiles 
The table reports the estimates of coefficients on Algo Trade of  firm fixed effects panel regressions with 
effect of Algo Trade on Tobin’s q varying across quintile groups based on the lagged Amihud illiquidity 
(Panel A) or the lagged idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) (Panel B). The model specification is shown in 
Equation (3.3). Amihud illiquidity is the annual average of daily ratio of the absolute stock return to its 
dollar volume. Idiosyncratic volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the residuals from fitting the 
four-factor model (Fama-French (1993) three factors plus the momentum factor) to daily returns over the 
fiscal year. All control variables are included but only coefficients on Algo Trade are reported. Models (1), 
(2), and (3) control for Turnover, Volume, and Dollar Volume, respectively. The industry classifications are 
defined by Fama and French (1997). T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and 
within correlation clustered by firm. The sample period is from 2002 through 2006. Only common stocks 
(those with a share code of 10 or 11 in the CRSP database) are included in the sample. See Table 3.1 for 
variable definitions. 
 Panel A: Lagged Amihud Illiquidity  Panel B: Lagged IVOL 
Quintile (n) (1)  (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
1 (Lowest) 0.143 0.116 0.072  0.195 0.191 0.169 
 (2.43) (1.99) (1.25)  (3.65) (3.60) (3.21) 
2 0.165 0.120 0.042  0.144 0.131 0.091 
 (2.98) (2.16) (0.76)  (2.82) (2.57) (1.81) 
3 0.220 0.178 0.102  0.164 0.136 0.089 
 (4.08) (3.32) (1.91)  (3.11) (2.61) (1.72) 
4 0.298 0.269 0.212  0.280 0.243 0.183 
 (4.77) (4.31) (3.38)  (5.31) (4.65) (3.49) 
5 (Highest) 0.410 0.383 0.358  0.422 0.369 0.300 
 (6.07) (5.73) (5.29)  (6.59) (5.78) (4.68) 
Control for Turnover Volume Dollar 
volume 
 Turnover Volume Dollar 
volume 
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,123 20,123 20,123  20,123 20,123 20,123 
Adjusted R2 0.378 0.374 0.381  0.378 0.374 0.380 
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3.4.3.2. Volatility Channel 
If algorithmic trading enhances firm value through reducing idiosyncratic stock 
return volatility, its effect on firm value is expected to be stronger for firms with higher 
idiosyncratic stock return volatility, which is hypothesis H2b. We use idiosyncratic 
volatility (IVOL) to measure stock return volatility,32 with IVOL defined as the standard 
deviation of the residuals from fitting the four-factor model (Fama-French (1993) three 
factors plus the momentum factor) to daily returns over the fiscal year.33 To test the 
hypothesis H2b, we take the same approaches as in the previous section. First, we include 
an interaction term between Algo Trade and lagged IVOL, IVOLt-1, in the firm fixed effects 
panel regressions. The results are shown in Panel B of Table 3.5. Although Algo Trade 
itself becomes insignificant, the interaction term is positive and significant at 1% level, 
suggesting that the effect of algorithmic trading on firm value is stronger when 
idiosyncratic volatility is higher, consistent with the hypothesis H2b.   
We then apply a block-diagonal regression approach to test the hypothesis H2b and 
to allow for a nonlinear stock return volatility dependence of the effect of algorithmic 
trading on firm value. Stocks are sorted into quintile groups each year based on IVOLt-1, 
                                               
32 The results are qualitatively the same when we use volatility of raw daily returns over the fiscal year 
instead of idiosyncratic volatility. 
33 Our measure of IVOL is computed similarly to Ang et al. (2006). Fu (2009) shows that the negative 
relation between IVOL and expected return found by Ang et al. (2006) is driven mainly by return reversals 
of a subset of small stocks with high IVOL, and that the true relation should be positive. To ensure that our 
measure of IVOL is positively related to future returns, we perform a test using our sample. We form decile 
portfolios each year based on lagged IVOL, and compute return of each portfolio. Then we compute the 
time series average of portfolio returns. We find a positive relation between lagged IVOL and return. The 
portfolio return increases when moving from the lowest IVOL portfolio to the highest IVOL portfolio, with 
the return of the highest IVOL portfolio more than double that of the lowest IVOL portfolio. 
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and we define Algo Trade_n for each IVOLt-1 quintile. We then estimate firm fixed effects 
panel regressions using the specification of the Equation (3.3) with year and industry fixed 
effects controlled. As shown in Panel B of Table 3.6, the coefficients on Algo Trade_n are 
positive and significant across all quintiles in all three specifications, and generally 
increase when moving from low to high IVOLt-1 quintiles, consistent with hypothesis H2b. 
Moreover, the effect of algorithmic trading on firm value is nonlinearly dependent on 
idiosyncratic stock return volatility. Moving up from the lowest IVOLt-1 quintile, the 
coefficient on Algo Trade_n decreases slightly initially and then increases, and it is 
significantly greater for the highest IVOLt-1 quintile than for the lowest IVOLt-1 quintile. 
For example, in model (1) with turnover controlled, the coefficient on Algo Trade_n drops 
from 0.195 at the quintile 1 (the lowest quintile) to 0.144 at the quintile 2, followed by 
gradual increasing to 0.422 at the quintile 5 (the highest quintile), with the largest increase 
occurring from the quintiles 4 to 5.  
The overall results of testing the volatility channel indicate that the effect of 
algorithmic trading on firm value is stronger for firms with more volatile idiosyncratic 
stock returns. The results are consistent with algorithmic trading enhancing firm value 
through a reduction of idiosyncratic stock return volatility. 
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Table 3.7. Test Price Discovery and Information Asymmetry Hypotheses Using Firm Fixed 
Effects Regression 
The table reports results of testing price discovery and information asymmetry hypotheses using firm fixed 
effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q. The independent variables are the same as in 
equitation (1), with an additional interaction term between Algo Trade and Analyst (analyst coverage) (Panel 
A) or PIN (information asymmetry) (Panel B) included. Models (1), (2) and (3) control for Turnover, 
Volume, and Dollar Volume, respectively. Coefficients on year, industry, and firm fixed effects are not 
reported. T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and within correlation clustered 
by firm. The sample period is from 2002 through 2006. Only common stocks are included in the sample. 
See Table 3.1 for variable definitions. 
 Panel A:  Analyst Coverage  Panel B: Information Asymmetry 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Algo Trade 0.151 0.072 0.061  -0.008 -0.155 -0.225 
 (2.23) (1.07) (0.89)  (-0.08) (-1.63) (-2.37) 
Algo Trade*Analyst 0.128 0.177 0.134     
 (3.00) (4.12) (3.18)     
Algo Trade*PIN     1.099 1.573 1.675 
     (3.13) (4.64) (4.99) 
Turnover 0.062    0.056   
 (7.91)    (6.45)   
Volume  0.052    0.044  
  (6.72)    (5.38)  
Dollar Volume   0.024    0.024 
   (10.53)    (10.13) 
ROA -0.287 -0.272 -0.271  -0.270 -0.257 -0.257 
 (-1.92) (-1.81) (-1.81)  (-1.77) (-1.68) (-1.68) 
Capex 1.568 1.647 1.555  1.556 1.622 1.523 
 (5.57) (5.83) (5.51)  (5.38) (5.60) (5.27) 
Firm Size -0.578 -0.572 -0.593  -0.595 -0.593 -0.618 
 (-15.97) (-15.74) (-16.31)  (-16.06) (-15.94) (-16.63) 
Leverage 0.010 0.015 0.049  0.236 0.237 0.285 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.43)  (2.35) (2.35) (2.81) 
Analyst 0.432 0.477 0.462  0.368 0.384 0.387 
 (14.73) (15.97) (15.66)  (13.87) (14.42) (14.58) 
Stock Return 0.623 0.640 0.637  0.623 0.637 0.632 
 (36.23) (37.05) (36.95)  (35.83) (36.41) (36.35) 
Lagged Return 0.255 0.272 0.265  0.252 0.264 0.256 
 (22.45) (23.89) (23.59)  (21.63) (22.55) (22.21) 
Dividend 0.152 0.150 0.139  0.162 0.159 0.145 
 (4.37) (4.32) (3.99)  (4.54) (4.45) (4.07) 
SP500 0.190 0.097 0.001  0.202 0.118 0.017 
 (2.57) (1.34) (0.01)  (2.50) (1.48) (0.21) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,123 20,123 20,123  19,460 19,460 19,460 
Adjusted R2 0.377 0.374 0.380  0.378 0.376 0.383 
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3.4.3.3. Price Discovery Channel 
If algorithmic trading enhances firm value by contributing to price discovery due to 
the superior ability of computer algorithms to efficiently incorporate information into 
stock prices, the effect of algorithmic trading on firm value is expected to be stronger for 
firms with more publicly available information, such as firms with higher analyst 
coverage, as stated in the hypothesis H2c. To test this hypothesis, we follow the same 
approaches applied above for testing H2a (illiquidity) and H2b (IVOL). First, we include 
an interaction term between Algo Trade and analyst coverage, Algo Trade*Analyst, in the 
firm fixed effects panel regression. As shown in Panel A of Table 3.7, the interaction term 
has significantly positive coefficients, and Algo Trade itself has positive coefficients that 
are significant in model (1) and insignificant in models (2) and (3). The results imply that 
the positive effect of algorithmic trading on firm value is stronger for firms with higher 
analyst coverage, consistent with the hypothesis H2c.34 
We then explore the potential nonlinear relation between the effect of algorithmic 
trading on firm value and analyst coverage. We sort stocks into quintile groups each year 
based on analyst coverage, define Algo Trade_n for each analyst coverage quintile, and 
estimate firm fixed effects panel regressions using the specification in Equation (3.3) with 
year and industry fixed effects.  
                                               
34 Analyst coverage is positively related to institutional ownership, and Algo Trade may be a better proxy 
for algorithmic trading for stocks with higher institutional ownership. To mitigate the concern that the 
stronger effect of Algo Trade on firm value for stocks with higher analyst coverage merely reflects a better 
proxy of Algo Trade for algorithmic trading for stocks with higher institutional ownership, we additionally 
control for institutional ownership, and the results are unaffected qualitatively, with the coefficients on 
analyst coverage (Analyst) and the interaction term (Algo Trade*Analyst) being significantly positive.        
 93 
 
Table 3.8. Firm Fixed Effects Regressions with Effect of Algo Trade on Tobin’s q Varying 
Across Analyst Coverage or Information Asymmetry Quintiles 
The table reports the estimates of coefficients on Algo Trade of firm fixed effects panel regressions with 
effect of Algo Trade on Tobin’s q varying across quintile groups based on analyst coverage (Panel A) or 
information asymmetry measured by PIN (Panel B). The model specification is shown in Equation (3.3). 
All control variables are included but only coefficients on Algo Trade are reported. Models (1), (2) and (3) 
control for Turnover, Volume and Dollar Volume, respectively. The industry classifications are defined by 
Fama and French (1997). T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and within 
correlation clustered by firm. The sample period is from 2002 through 2006. Only common stocks (those 
with a share code of 10 or 11 in the CRSP database) are included in the sample. See Table 3.1 for variable 
definitions. 
 
 
 
The results are in Table 3.8, Panel A. The coefficient estimates show that the primary 
difference in the firm value-algorithmic trading relation is between firms in the bottom 
analyst quintile and firms in the upper four analyst quintiles. Indeed, unreported tests show 
that the coefficients for the bottom analyst quintile are significantly smaller than 
coefficients for the upper four quintiles, and the coefficients among the upper four 
quintiles generally do not differ significantly from each other. Thus, the effect of Algo 
 Panel A:  Analyst coverage  Panel B: Information Asymmetry 
Quintile (n) (1)  (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
1 (Lowest) 0.149 0.096 0.071  -0.088 -0.177 -0.225 
 (2.10) (1.36) (0.99)  (-1.25) (-2.58) (-3.24) 
2 0.441 0.404 0.353  0.042 -0.034 -0.098 
 (6.56) (6.00) (5.22)  (0.67) (-0.56) (-1.60) 
3 0.332 0.315 0.240  0.249 0.211 0.158 
 (5.41) (5.14) (3.92)  (4.45) (3.85) (2.88) 
4 0.340 0.330 0.241  0.367 0.361 0.324 
 (5.24) (5.07) (3.73)  (6.04) (5.95) (5.31) 
5 (Highest) 0.388 0.410 0.319  0.374 0.399 0.384 
 (4.92) (5.17) (4.12)  (5.22) (5.59) (5.38) 
Control for Turnover Volume Dollar 
volume 
 Turnover Volume Dollar 
volume 
Other Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,123 20,123 20,123  19,443 19,443 19,443 
Adjusted R2 0.378 0.375 0.380  0.380 0.379 0.385 
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Trade on firm value is stronger when analyst coverage is higher, consistent with the 
hypothesis H2c. The results are consistent with algorithmic trading contributing to price 
discovery and thus increasing firm value. 
3.4.3.4. Information Asymmetry Channel 
Our hypothesis H2d is that if algorithmic trading enhances firm value through 
efficiently incorporating information into stock prices and reducing information 
asymmetry, its effect on firm value is expected to be stronger for firms with greater 
information asymmetry. To test H2d, we use PIN (probability of informed trade) to 
measure information asymmetry,35 and again apply the two approaches, the firm fixed 
effects panel regression including an interaction term, and the block diagonal regression 
approach. As shown in the Panel B of Table 3.7, the coefficient on the interaction term 
between Algo Trade and PIN is negative and significant at 1% level, while the coefficient 
on Algo Trade is insignificant or significantly negative (in model (3)), suggesting that the 
effect of algorithmic trading on firm value is stronger for firms with greater PIN, i.e., 
greater information asymmetry, consistent with the hypothesis H2d. The results from the 
block diagonal regressions shown in Panel B of Table 3.8 reveal more details about the 
information asymmetry dependence of the effect of algorithmic trading on firm value. 
Moving from the lowest to the highest PIN quintiles, the coefficient on Algo Trade_n 
increases monotonically. For the bottom two PIN quintiles, algorithmic trading has an 
                                               
35 PIN data is downloaded from Stephen Brown’s website 
(http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/sbrown/pinsdata.html). We thank Stephen Brown for making this data 
available. The PINs are computed using an extended EKO (Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997)) model and 
are more robust than the basic EKO PINs according to Brown and Hillegeist (2007). 
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insignificant or even negative effect on firm value (two of the three coefficients for the 
bottom quintile are significantly negative). For the top three PIN quintiles, the effect of 
algorithmic trading on firm value is significantly positive, consistent with the hypothesis 
H2d that effect of algorithmic trading is stronger for firms with greater information 
asymmetry. The results are consistent with algorithmic trading efficiently reducing 
information asymmetry and thereby enhancing firm value. 
In summary, the results in this section are consistent with hypotheses that 
algorithmic trading increases firm value through increasing stock liquidity, reducing stock 
return volatility, contributing to price discovery, and reducing information asymmetry.  
3.4.4. Additional Robustness Checks 
The results in previous sections show that the finding of a positive effect of 
algorithmic trading on firm value is robust to the inclusion of year, and industry fixed 
effects, the control for reverse causality, and the use of 2SLS regression approach. This 
section performs additional robustness checks. 
One issue is the non-normality and skewness of the distributions of several 
dependent and independent variables. Summary statistics reported in Table 3.1 show that 
Tobin’s q, Turnover, Volume, and Dollar Volume are right skewed. To address this 
concern, we use a rank regression approach. All variables in Equation (3.1), except for the 
dummy variables, are ranked from low to high in the 0 to 100 scale, and the ranks, instead 
of the original value, of the variables are used in regression analysis. The model 
specification is the same as Equation (3.1).  
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Table 3.9. Robustness Check: Firm Fixed Effect Panel Rank Regressions 
The table reports results of firm fixed effects panel rank regressions. All variables (except for the dummy 
variables) in Equation (3.1) are ranked from low to high in the 0 to 100 scale, and the ranks of the variables 
are used in regressions. The independent variables include Algo Trade, Turnover (model (1)), Volume 
(model (2)), Dollar Volume (model (3)), ROA, Capex, Firm Size, Leverage, Analyst, Stock Return, Lagged 
Stock Return (Lagged Return), Dividend, SP500, year dummies, industry dummies, and firm dummies. The 
industry classifications are defined by Fama and French (1997). Coefficients on year, industry, and firm 
dummies are not reported. T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and within 
correlation clustered by firm. The sample period is from 2002 through 2006. Only common stocks (those 
with a share code of 10 or 11 in the CRSP database) are included in the sample. See Table 3.1 for variable 
definitions. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Algo Trade 0.058 0.075 0.071 
 (7.90) (10.45) (10.45) 
Turnover 0.145   
 (15.87)   
Volume  0.292  
  (17.36)  
Dollar Volume   0.457 
   (28.10) 
ROA 0.134 0.134 0.107 
 (14.49) (14.67) (12.37) 
Capex 0.053 0.053 0.036 
 (6.97) (7.09) (5.01) 
Firm Size -0.619 -0.682 -0.858 
 (-19.22) (-21.10) (-26.66) 
Leverage -0.003 0.001 0.015 
 (-0.35) (0.13) (1.89) 
Analyst 0.139 0.132 0.087 
 (13.08) (12.40) (8.56) 
Stock Return 0.225 0.226 0.206 
 (63.20) (63.51) (59.76) 
Lagged Return 0.102 0.100 0.076 
 (32.07) (31.32) (23.83) 
Dividend 0.034 0.034 0.025 
 (4.23) (4.33) (3.30) 
SP500 0.023 0.015 0.021 
 (1.99) (1.34) (1.83) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,625 18,625 18,625 
Adjusted R2 0.484 0.489 0.526 
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Table 3.9 reports the estimation results of firm fixed effects panel rank regressions 
with year and industry dummies also controlled. In the three models that control for 
Turnover, Volume, and Dollar Volume, respectively, the coefficient on Algo Trade is 
positive and significant at 1% level. The results are consistent with algorithmic trading 
having a positive impact on firm value. Thus, the main result is robust to the use of rank 
regressions.  
The second robustness check is using alternative proxy for algorithmic trading. In 
the analysis thus far, we follow Boehmer et al. (2012) to define an electronic message as 
either a trade or a change in BBO, and construct the proxy Algo Trade as the negative of 
number of trade normalized message. However, algorithmic traders may submit orders 
both inside and outside the quotes. So, alternatively, we consider updates of all quotes, not 
just the best quotes, as messages, and define a message as either a trade or a change in 
quotes. We then define the alternative proxy for algorithmic trading, Algo Trade_q, as the 
negative of number of trades divided by the number of messages that include the number 
of updates in quotes and the number of trades. Table 3.10 reports results of the firm fixed 
effects panel regression using Algo Trade_q to measure algorithmic trading activity. The 
coefficient on Algo Trade_q is positive and significant in all model specifications. 
Therefore, our results are robust to the use of an alternative proxy for algorithmic trading. 
Our measures of algorithmic trading and stock returns are constructed over fiscal 
years and the firm characteristics variables are measured at the end of fiscal years. 
Asynchronous fiscal years undermine the usefulness of year fixed effects for controlling 
for  macroeconomic conditions.  To mitigate this concern, we perform a robustness check 
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Table 3.10. Robustness Check: Firm Fixed Effect Panel Regressions Using Alternative Proxy 
for Algorithmic Trading 
The table reports estimates of firm fixed effect panel regressions using an alternative measure of message 
traffic to construct proxy for algorithmic trading. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q. The main  
independent variable is Algo Trade_q, a proxy for algorithmic trading defined over firm i’s fiscal year as 
the negative of number of trades divided by the number of message that includes the number of changes in 
quote and the number of trades. Other independent variables are the same as in equitation (1). Models (1), 
(2) and (3) control for Turnover, Volume, and Dollar Volume, respectively. Coefficients on year, industry, 
and firm dummies are not reported. T-statistics in parentheses are adjusted for both heteroskedasticity and 
within correlation clustered by firm. The sample period is from 2002 through 2006. Only common stocks 
are included in the sample. See Table 3.1 for definitions of other variables. 
 Panel A  Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Algo Trade_q 1.318 1.325 1.333  0.918 0.893 0.939 
 (13.98) (14.08) (14.29)  (8.05) (7.88) (8.34) 
Turnover 0.070    0.063   
 (8.99)    (8.07)   
Volume  0.060    0.053  
  (7.35)    (6.62)  
Dollar Volume   0.029    0.026 
   (12.71)    (11.32) 
ROA -0.367 -0.352 -0.346  -0.318 -0.301 -0.301 
 (-2.43) (-2.32) (-2.29)  (-2.13) (-2.01) (-2.02) 
Capex 1.806 1.898 1.752  1.634 1.713 1.606 
 (6.37) (6.68) (6.19)  (5.78) (6.03) (5.68) 
Firm Size -0.505 -0.495 -0.531  -0.576 -0.570 -0.592 
 (-14.71) (-14.37) (-15.40)  (-15.84) (-15.62) (-16.26) 
Leverage -0.099 -0.098 -0.046  -0.027 -0.023 0.017 
 (-0.87) (-0.85) (-0.40)  (-0.25) (-0.21) (0.15) 
Analyst 0.364 0.390 0.397  0.366 0.390 0.396 
 (14.00) (14.90) (15.27)  (14.16) (15.03) (15.35) 
Stock Return 0.598 0.618 0.617  0.622 0.641 0.637 
 (36.60) (37.69) (37.75)  (36.31) (37.21) (37.12) 
Lagged Return 0.235 0.254 0.247  0.250 0.267 0.258 
 (21.85) (23.63) (23.29)  (22.02) (23.50) (23.14) 
Dividend 0.196 0.197 0.178  0.160 0.158 0.146 
 (5.74) (5.76) (5.20)  (4.61) (4.56) (4.21) 
SP500 0.229 0.121 -0.000  0.209 0.112 0.006 
 (3.04) (1.65) (-0.00)  (2.78) (1.52) (0.07) 
Year Dummy No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy No No No  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Dummy Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20,123 20,123 20,123  20,123 20,123 20,123 
Adjusted R2 0.370 0.366 0.375  0.379 0.376 0.383 
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by analyzing firm-fiscal year observations with fiscal year ends of December only. The 
results are qualitatively similar to those reported.   
 
3.5. Conclusion 
While algorithmic trading is criticized for creating excess volatility and destabilizing 
stock market, some evidence suggests that algorithmic trading positively impacts market 
quality by increasing liquidity, reducing idiosyncratic volatility, and contributing to price 
discovery. We contribute evidence to the debate by examining the effect of algorithmic 
trading activity on firm value.  
Using an algorithmic trading proxy based on electronic message traffic, we find a 
significantly positive effect of algorithmic trading on firm value. The result is robust to 
controlling for other variables related to firm value, the use of various specifications, 
inclusion of year, industry and firm fixed effects, reverse causality, the use of 2SLS 
regression approach to address endogeneity, and the use of alternative proxy for 
algorithmic trading. The positive effect of algorithmic trading is stronger for firms with 
lower stock liquidity, higher idiosyncratic volatility, higher analyst coverage, and greater 
information asymmetry, consistent with hypotheses that algorithmic trading increases firm 
value through increasing liquidity, reducing volatility, contributing to price discovery and 
reducing information asymmetry. The overall results in this study suggest that algorithmic 
trading generates net benefits for firm value.  
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4. SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation includes two essays in corporate finance, with the first essay 
studying the impact of local institutional shareholders on corporate debt maturity policies, 
and the second essay focusing on the effect of algorithmic trading on firm value.  
The first essay examines the relation between the geographic proximity of a firm’s 
institutional investors (shareholders) and the maturity structure of its debt. Monitoring by 
local institutional investors likely increases the intensity of debtholder-stockholder 
conflicts. Shorter debt maturity should reduce these conflicts and the associated debt 
agency costs. Local institutional investors may also pressure firms to employ short-term 
debt as a means of disciplining managers and thereby reducing equity agency costs 
stemming from manager-stockholder conflicts. Thus, we hypothesize that firms with local 
institutional investors choose shorter debt maturity structures.  
Using dynamic system GMM estimators to account for endogeneity and dynamic 
relations between debt maturity structure and institutional proximity, we find that firms 
with local institutional investors have shorter maturity debt. Similar results obtain for the 
maturity of new debt issues. To help establish causality, we use Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) as a quasi-natural experiment, conduct a nearest neighbor matching analysis that 
holds location constant, and employ a sample of firms’ headquarter relocations as quasi-
exogenous shocks to the locality of institutional investors. The results demonstrate the 
importance of local institutional investors in affecting firms’ debt maturity policy choices.  
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Motivated by recent evidence that algorithmic trading impacts market quality, the 
second essay examines the effect of algorithmic trading on firm value. Given the 
significant role of algorithmic trading in the stock market, investors, academics, and 
policymakers need a deeper understanding of its benefits and costs. Prior literature that 
studies the impact of algorithmic trading on market quality provides mixed results on the 
question of whether algorithmic trading is a beneficial financial innovation, leaving it the 
subject of intense public debate and controversy. We contribute evidence that should be 
useful to the debate by examining the impact of algorithmic trading on firm value. 
Using an algorithmic trading proxy based on electronic message traffic, we find a 
positive relation between algorithmic trading and firm value. The result is robust to 
controlling for other variables related to firm value, the use of various specifications, 
inclusion of year, industry and firm fixed effects, reverse causality, the use of 2SLS 
regression approach to address endogeneity, and the use of alternative proxy for 
algorithmic trading. The positive effect of algorithmic trading is stronger for firms with 
lower stock liquidity, higher idiosyncratic volatility, higher analyst coverage, and greater 
information asymmetry, consistent with hypotheses that algorithmic trading increases firm 
value through increasing liquidity, reducing volatility, contributing to price discovery and 
reducing information asymmetry. The overall results in this study suggest that algorithmic 
trading generates net benefits for firm value.  
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